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INTRODUCTION: IS SOUTH AFRICA LOSING ITS MINDS?
JONATHAN CRUSH, DAVID MCDONALD AND VINCENT WILLIAMS
M
any countries, South Africa included, are in a panic
about skills emigration – the so-called “brain drain.”1
One business-oriented institute even thinks that South
Africa’s skills shortage is so “desperate” that the coun-
try should immediately throw open its borders to any-
one who wishes to enter.2 Yet most South Africans are ambiguous about
the wisdom of using immigration policy to offset skills loss.3
Immigration, no matter how selective and tightly controlled, arouses
nationalist passions and causes moral panics. 
Anti-immigrationists argue that governments are supposed to protect
citizens from “outsiders”; not let them in to compete with locals for jobs
and resources.4 Even the most liberal immigration countries have strong
and vigorous anti-immigration lobbies. In fact, if immigration policy
were driven purely by the wishes of citizens, there would be very little
legal immigration in the modern world. Why then do some govern-
ments go against the popular will and their own constituencies in
encouraging immigration? Presuming that they are not acting totally
irrationally, they appear to believe that immigration and the interests of
citizens are not always incompatible.
South Africa is hampered by a very clouded and unsavoury immigra-
tion history.5 Before 1994, immigration policy was a naked instrument
of racial domination. There was also considerable emigration during the
apartheid years, but emigration rarely exceeded immigration (Figure
1.1). What has happened to immigration and emigration since 1994?
Government data certainly underestimates the extent of emigration. A
recent study by the SANSA project at UCT estimates that over
233,000 South Africans emigrated permanently to five countries – the
United Kingdom, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand –
between 1989 and 1997.6
Is it possible that skills emigration is being offset by a proactive
immigration policy and recruiting of skilled foreigners to make up for
the “brain drain”? On the contrary, immigration has fallen significantly
since the early 1990s. In 1993, South Africa let in 9,800 immigrants. By
1997, the number had more than halved, to only 4,100. These figures
raise some pointed questions.
The SAMP survey of South African emigration intentions reported
in Chapter 1 of this publication suggests that the brain drain is unlikely
to slow over the next decade, and that black South Africans are as likely
to leave as white South Africans. This represents a potentially significant
drain of human capital. While politicians, the media and business
bemoan these patterns of emigration, there is not much they can do
about it. The constitution guarantees that no restrictions will be placed
on the free movement of South Africans to greener pastures.
As South Africa engages in an active nation-building process, there
is a danger of a misleading idea taking hold; i.e. that nation building
means that no immigration should be permitted. This, of course, may be
one reason for the dramatic decline in immigration since 1994. The
thinking of the Minister of Home Affairs on these matters was recently
revealed in the Draft White Paper on International Migration. What is
striking about the White Paper is its emphasis on control, on keeping
people out, on removing those who South Africans don’t want. There is
little systematic consideration of the potential role of immigration as a
tool of economic and social policy.7
The White Paper misses the opportunity to initiate a public debate
on the possible benefits for South Africa of legal immigration, but also
encourages South African citizens to take up an anti-immigrationist
stance. The White Paper does, however, recognise the virtues of greater
freedom of temporary residence and work in South Africa; and for that
the drafters are commended.
The lack of encouragement of public debate is not merely a sin of
omission. The Draft White Paper actually advances a misleading argu-
ment about why immigration is supposedly undesirable for South Africa.
Canada and New Zealand, we are told, encourage immigrants because
they have lots of space and not many people. South Africa, in contrast,
has too many people and not enough space; South Africa should thus
stop all immigration. In fact, neither Canada nor New Zealand sees
immigration primarily as a tool to boost population numbers. 
These two countries don’t recruit South Africans at random — they
target the most skilled, trained, experienced and entrepreneurial.
Innovative and hard-working immigrants add massive value to the new
economy and society. Their net impact is hugely positive for national
economic development and the citizenry.
South Africa is shedding skills at a worrying rate to its global com-
petitors. These countries have no compunction about creaming off
skilled people from other countries. Why should South Africa be that
different? Why should it not also gain massive value from a selective
immigration policy that targets the brightest and best of other coun-
tries?
There are two legitimate fears that need to be addressed. First, it has
been argued that this policy would simply be a recipe for renewed
European immigration. However, the facts show that the majority of
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immigrants to the western “immigrant recruiting nations” are no longer
from Europe. These countries are drawing skills globally, including from
Africa, Asia and Latin America. Perhaps South Africans would feel
morally queasy about “robbing” other developing countries. The point is
that these are people in those countries who are looking to leave any-
way. If South Africa is not one of the options, they will just go else-
where.
Second, there is the argument that immigrants deprive locals of jobs.
However, when it comes to skilled immigrants, most of the evidence
suggests the opposite. They create enterprises and jobs for locals, they
enhance the productivity of existing enterprises and they pass on valu-
able skills and experience. 
We raise these issues not to prescribe an immigration policy but to
initiate debate. What we suggest is much greater public and official dis-
cussion about the pros and cons of skills immigration and its advantages
and disadvantages for South Africa. Nation-building and immigration
are not mutually incompatible. In some circumstances, they may actual-
ly be mutually reinforcing.
The existence of the Draft White Paper on International Migration
provides a good opportunity for these issues to be raised and publicly
debated. Uncontrolled immigration is in no-one’s best interests. But a
selective immigration policy could be critical in offsetting the brain
drain and injecting new ideas, innovations and energies into the coun-
try. Without such a debate, insularity and exclusive nationalism will
win the day. This will not be in the best interests of South Africans.
In order to put this debate on a sound footing, rigorous research is
required into the so-called “skills crisis” in South Africa. To this end,
the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) in 1998-9 embarked
on a major research project on skills migration to and within the SADC
region. Amongst the products of this activity are a major report on the
development of an immigrant selection system for South Africa;8 a
forthcoming special issue of the journal Africa Insight on skills migra-
tion in SADC and several survey reports. The two papers in this publi-
cation are the first products of the survey component of the project. 
As this research was getting under way, the South African public was
presented with two very contradictory messages about the brain drain.
First, in a much-publicized speech in September 1998, President Nelson
Mandela was reported as saying that those who were emigrating from
South Africa were cowardly and unpatriotic and that the country was
pleased to see the back of them.9 At around the same time, the Sunday
Times published the results of a misleading readership survey which
seemed to show that nearly 75% of skilled South Africans would quit
the country in the near future.10 These claims do not stand up to the
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research results reported here.11
The objective of the first survey was to gauge the dimensions of the
“brain drain” from South Africa and to ascertain whether the drain
would escalate into a chronic and damaging skills shortage. The second,
complementary, report analyses the results of a survey of South African
employers on their attitudes towards the actual and potential loss of
skilled personnel. The investigation was designed to assess the hiring
practices, attitudes and responses of enterprises towards the skills short-
age in key areas of the economy.
Chapter 1 reports the results of the first survey, a representative
national sample of skilled South Africans. This is the first survey of its
kind and provides invaluable insights into the attitudes and stay-go
intentions of skilled South Africans. The authors point out that there is
a great deal of hearsay surrounding the reasons why people leave. They
suggest that even if it is true that crime, violence and declining public
services are responsible, we still need to ask what distinguishes those
who go from those who stay.
Predicting exactly how many skilled people will emigrate from South
Africa in the future is not a precise science. Even if a person says they
want to leave, there is no certainty that they actually will. The authors
therefore develop the concept of emigration potential, which is not the
same thing as a firm prediction of future emigration patterns and trends.
Emigration potential consists of several different elements. To what
extent has a skilled person even considered the idea? To what extent do
they actually want to emigrate? To what extent do factors outside their
control affect the likelihood of leaving? Exactly when do they plan to
leave? What preparatory measures have they taken?
A distinction is necessary between temporary and permanent move-
ment (or emigration). There is no sense decrying a “brain drain” if
skilled people intend to return to South Africa. Permanent movement
on the other hand is clearly indicative of a brain drain.
The main findings of the study are as follows:
• The economically active population in South Africa is approxi-
mately 17,000,000. Using various criteria, the size of South Africa’s
skilled sector is defined at 1,600,000 (or 9% of the economically active
population). Given the role of apartheid in reserving important posi-
tions in the economy for whites, it is no surprise that the random sam-
ple was predominantly white (72%). Of the remainder, 18% were
African, 8% coloured and 3% Indian.
• The pool of skilled South Africans who might conceivably leave is
a large one. Over two-thirds (69%) say they have given the idea of emi-
gration some thought (and 38% say they have given it a “great deal” of
thought). There is a perception that the brain drain is a “white 
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phenomenon” only. This is misleading; 69% of whites and 68% of
blacks have given emigration some thought.
• Thinking about leaving, and actually doing so, are not the same
thing. Only 20% say that it is very likely that they would leave for a
period of more than two years. Slightly higher proportions of skilled
whites (22%) than blacks (15%) say that a permanent move is very
likely. On the other hand, skilled blacks are more likely to leave South
Africa on a temporary basis (15%) than whites (10%).
• Specifying a time frame dramatically cuts the levels of potential
emigration. Only 3% said that it was “quite likely” that they would
leave within six months, 5% say they will leave in the next two years,
and 13% say it is “very likely” that they will leave within five years.
The proportions of skilled blacks and whites who express a strong prob-
ability of leaving within six months or within two years are statistically
the same (though whites are more likely to express a strong probability
of leaving within a five year time period).
• The firmest indicator of a person’s emigration potential is whether
they have actually begun the process of application for emigration docu-
mentation. Some 6% say they have applied for work permits in another
country, 5% have applied for permanent residence elsewhere, and 3%
had applied for foreign citizenship. Again, there are no statistically sig-
nificant differences between skilled white and black South Africans.
• A composite statistical index was used to summarize each person’s
potential to emigrate. Around 2% of the sample fall into the “very
high” category of emigration potential (of leaving South Africa for a
period of two years or more, within the next two to five years). Some
10% have a “high” emigration potential and 25% have a “moderate”
emigration potential. Only 20% have no emigration potential.
• There is absolutely no difference in the proportion of skilled
whites and blacks who fall into the “very high” category (2% of either
group). A higher proportion of skilled whites (11%) than skilled blacks
(4%) fall into the “high” probability category. But adding the two
together, the difference in proportions of skilled whites (13%) than
skilled blacks (6%) with a high/very high probability of leaving the
country within five years, is not nearly as great as might be expected
• If only those with a “very high” emigration potential left the coun-
try in the next five years, this would translate into a potential gross loss
of around 32,000 skilled people. If those with a high potential are
added, the number could jump to 192,000.
• The United States (24%), Australia (22%), United Kingdom
(15%), New Zealand (12%) and Canada (11%) rank as the five most
often mentioned emigration destinations.
• Skilled South Africans were asked about their satisfaction with a
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wide variety of measures of “quality of life.” There are high levels of dis-
satisfaction with (a) the cost of living, (b) levels of taxation, (c) safety
and security, and (d) the standard of public and commercial services.
With the exception of standard of services, dissatisfaction extends across
racial boundaries and is not a predominantly white pre-occupation.
They are far less dissatisfied with personal economic conditions as well
as with schools and available health care. The single exception is black
dissatisfaction with current income levels.
• We see far higher levels of relative dissatisfaction among skilled
whites when we ask them to compare their lives today versus five years
ago. Some 65% of skilled whites say their lives got worse in the previous
five years. In stark contrast, 65% of skilled blacks say it got better. But
all skilled South Africans tend to feel that life will only get worse.
Skilled South Africans are particularly pessimistic about their future
cost of living, levels of taxation and safety, and the standard of public
services. Again, this pessimism extends across the racial divide.
• The major difference between white and black skilled South
Africans is in political attitudes. Skilled whites are highly dissatisfied
with government performance, feel that it does not represent them and
distrust government. Skilled blacks have far less pessimistic views.
Skilled whites are widely opposed to affirmative action (83%) while
only 20% of skilled blacks are opposed.
• Those with high emigration potential were asked what, if any-
thing, would lead them to stay in South Africa. Only 12% said that
there was “nothing” that could make them stay. One quarter (25%) said
improvements in safety and security would make them stay.
• Finally, would government steps to restrict emigration make them
more or less likely to leave? Such policies would be counter-productive
and hasten the exit of almost half of the high emigration potential
group. Specific steps such as requiring a year’s national service from stu-
dents leaving professional schools, an end to dual passport holding, or
increased fees for documents would actually hasten the exit of between
one-third to one-quarter of this group.
The second survey reported here shifted the focus from interviewing
individual South Africans to interviewing employers. The main findings
of this survey of 200 public and private sector enterprises were as fol-
lows:
• The survey captured a cross-section of enterprises from a range of
different sectors, of different sizes and with different ownership charac-
teristics. It includes a set of enterprises, private and public sector, for-
eign and local, which are leaders in the market for high skilled person-
nel in South Africa. The 200 enterprises employ an estimated 101 000
skilled personnel with the largest absolute numbers in banking and
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finance, education and health, and industrial. The sectors with the low-
est absolute numbers of skilled personnel were entertainment and
tourism, and construction.
• The sectors in which the ratio of skilled personnel to total
employment is especially high include education and health, banking
and finance and computers and IT services. The most high skills inten-
sive sectors are computers and IT services (57% of employees), business
services (47%), education and health (41%) and banking and finance
(29%). In total, these four sectors accounted for 78 000 skilled employ-
ees. In several computer services and IT enterprises the proportion of
highly skilled was 90% or more.
• Over 50% of enterprises employ a skilled workforce of citizens or
permanent residents alone. Some 46.5% employ some foreign high
skilled workers. The highest proportions are in banking and finance,
computers and IT services, education and health, and business services.
But across the 200 surveyed enterprises, foreign skilled personnel num-
ber in total only between 2 000 - 3 000 workers. Overall, non-South
Africans represent more than 5% of the total labour force in only 8% of
the enterprises.
• In certain multinational enterprises, foreign skilled personnel are
not in South Africa on a long-term basis. Rather, they are part of intra-
corporate movements involving a rotation of personnel or exchange
programmes. The sources of foreign skilled personnel vary, with the
most common countries of origin being the United Kingdom, Germany,
the USA, Italy, and Australia.
• Companies say that the impact of the emigration of skilled person-
nel has been much greater in the post-1994 period. The tempo of emi-
gration of skilled personnel appears to have escalated, especially from
1996 onwards. Overall, one-third of enterprises rated as “significant”
the outflow and impact of the brain drain, compared to only 2% for the
pre-elections period. Some 98% said the impact of emigration was none
or negligible before 1994. The corresponding figure for the post-1994
period falls to 67%.
• The brain drain to date is of only minor importance compared to
the total skills base of surveyed enterprises. In 67% of enterprises the
issue of emigration of high skilled personnel was rated as of no or negli-
gible importance.
• The perceived impact of the brain drain varies sectorally. The
numbers of enterprises reporting a significant impact was high in educa-
tion and health (59%), business services (47%), banking and finance
(43%), computers and IT services (35%) and industrial high tech
(35%).
• The most severe emerging skills shortage clearly relates to 
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computing and information technology personnel. A global labour mar-
ket has emerged in the sphere of computing and IT skills. Within this
market, South Africa is rapidly losing competitive ground to the aggres-
sive recruitment strategies and lucrative employment packages of enter-
prises in the USA, Western Europe and Australia.
• The major potential source of recruitment for new high skill per-
sonnel is South Africa rather than overseas. The survey disclosed that
the majority of enterprises prefer to hire local South African personnel
into high skill positions whenever possible.
• A key issue in offsetting the brain drain is the training pro-
grammes offered to employees. The operation of training programmes is
a major means for expanding an enterprise’s asset base of skilled person-
nel. A positive finding was that the vast majority of the surveyed enter-
prises – 85% of the total – are involved in training and skills upgrading
of their personnel. In many cases the budgets allocated to training and
upgrading of personnel are substantial and impressive.
• Finally, enterprises seeking to hire overseas employees report con-
sistently negative experiences with the Department of Home Affairs.
Almost without exception, there were complaints about delays, lack of
transparency and obstructionism. In the case of many private sector
enterprises, new growth and job opportunities for the South African
economy have been either postponed or, in many instances, lost forever
through what employers perceive to be the Department’s inability,
unwillingness or failure to expedite the entry into the country of a rela-
tively small number of highly skilled personnel.
Taken together, these two SAMP surveys provide unprecedented
insights into South Africa’s brain drain and, in so doing, challenge
many popular misconceptions. Their publication will, we hope, provide
a sound basis for a rational debate on immigration policy and the devel-
opment of a sound and workable alternative to current policy and irra-
tional anti-immigrant restrictionism.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE BRAIN DRAIN: WHAT DO SKILLED SOUTH AFRICANS THINK?
ROBERT MATTES AND WAYNE RICHMOND
I
n an interdependent, and increasingly global economy, maintain-
ing and enlarging its skilled labour force is vital to South Africa’s
national interest. Yet South Africa appears to be in a tight
squeeze.12 It is a developing new democracy committed to eradi-
cating the massive social, economic and political disparities of its
apartheid past. Part of this project is the empowerment and expansion
of the pool of racially disadvantaged workers. But this cannot be
achieved overnight.
At the same time, while statistics differ widely, significant numbers
of educated professionals and entrepreneurs have been leaving South
Africa to find work elsewhere, taking with them skills crucial to the
success of the country’s development. And it appears that this flight has
been exacerbated not only by the turmoil accompanying democratiza-
tion, but also the societal changes brought on by post-apartheid trans-
formation. Thus, attempts to train new skilled workers may strain to
keep pace with the skills lost through emigration, producing a net loss
of skilled workers, or what is known in South Africa as the “Brain
Drain.”
Yet estimates of the size and impact of this brain drain vary widely
and analyses of its causes remain speculative. Needless to say, the pre-
sent and potential size of this skills exodus, as well as its actual and
potential economic, social and political impacts are a major concern to
policy-makers.13
In order to assess the present and potential extent of South Africa’s
brain drain, as well as more accurately understand its causes, the
Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) in mid 1998 undertook a
national study of the issue. The study had two primary aims:
• To provide nationally representative and methodologically rigor-
ous empirical data on the emigration plans of skilled South Africans
(whether, and how they plan to do so, when, where they want to go).
• To examine and assess the range of factors that contribute to
skilled South Africans’ desire to leave the country. 
This report presents the findings of the research.
MEASURING SOUTH AFRICA’S BRAIN DRAIN
Historically, South Africa has been an immigrant (as well as migrant)
receiving country.14 Since 1940 the number of legal immigrants has 
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generally exceeded the number of emigrants, resulting in an overall pat-
tern of net in-migration gain.15 Unfortunately, the statistics available
from 1940 to 1990 fail to differentiate between skilled and non-skilled
migrants. Yet it is interesting to note the fluctuations in net migration
patterns and their correspondence to political and economic trends dur-
ing the apartheid era, especially the periods of net loss in 1960-1961 (fol-
lowing Sharpeville), 1977-1979 (Soweto and its aftermath), and 1986-
1988 (the States of Emergency) (Figure 1.1).
Data from the period of South Africa’s transition toward democracy
(1991-1993) and democratization period (1994 to the present) do
enable us to begin to isolate economically active persons arriving in and
leaving South Africa (defined by Statistics South Africa as employed
persons) (Figure 1.2).16 The official data from this period reveal a rapid
decline from a net gain of economically active persons to a net loss. In
1996 South Africa experienced its worst loss for at least eleven years.17
Yet it is also apparent that these official figures drastically underestimate
the extent of skills out-migration.
What is the actual extent of the brain drain, both in terms of its pre-
sent and potential size? As seen above, official statistics are not gathered
in a way that enables us to estimate this with any accuracy. Indeed, a
recent study by the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA)
LOSING OUR MINDS: SKILLS MIGRATION AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN BRAIN DRAIN
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(’
00
0)
Figure 1.1: South African Immigration Gains and Losses
1940–1990
19
40
19
45
19
50
19
55
19
60
19
65
19
70
19
75
19
80
19
85
19
89
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
project claims that official statistics are far too low, by as much as two-
thirds.18 Furthermore, it is very difficult to draw firm conclusions about
the type of people who are leaving since the data may not be collected
in this way, or may be collected in different ways at different points in
time.19 Neither is it very easy to determine how long these emigrants are
leaving for or whether they intend to return at some point in the future.
Migrants often leave with the intention of returning but change their
minds once they have left. The few surveys which have been done are
highly misleading.20
Common wisdom tends to attribute the loss of skills to the main
characteristics of the transition and democratization period: political
instability and uncertainty, heightened racial conflict, poor economic
performance, a heavy fall in the currency, and increasing crime and vio-
lence. Yet most debate and analysis about the causes of this problem are
based on hearsay and anecdote.
Some systematic attempts have been made by various analysts, as
well as Statistics South Africa, to document the factors that emigrants
cite for leaving. Most often cited are the lack of safety and security, poor
economic conditions, and poor social services.21 Yet it is by no means
certain that these are the key factors that actually pushed people out of
the country. The questions have only been asked of those who have
actually emigrated. But it is quite likely that crime, the economy and
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services would rate very highly as key grievances of all skilled South
Africans. If so, then we must ask what distinguishes those who leave
from those who stay behind.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In terms of the sample population, the idea of a “Brain Drain” implies a
depletion of skilled people who are vital to the functional core of the
economy. In business, the functional core is simply a subgroup of key per-
sonnel in an organization critical to its normal conduct of business. While
actual definitions of skilled persons vary, they all tend to focus on people
who have received some sort of specialized training that results in superior
technical competence, talent, or abilities that are applied in professional
occupations. Without these people, the operation and development of the
economy would be severely hindered.
Thus, for a survey of skilled South Africans, the definition of skills
requires that we approach a broader range of people than the typical
popular image might imply. The functional core of an economy does
not only consist of people with post-graduate degrees, in well-paying,
high level corporate positions.
Skilled people typically possess some specialized, formal training (e.g.
Technikon or University qualification). But the functional core of the
economy is also at times sustained by people who, despite having no
advanced formal education, have worked their way up the corporate
ladder or have started their own successful businesses.
Skilled South Africans also include people at various levels of the
corporate ladder. National economic performance will begin to break
down not only when businesses lose a certain number of senior man-
agers, but also when they cross a specific threshold of losses of middle-
level people who fill vital administrative and support functions. Middle-
level people also comprise the potential pool from which to fill senior
positions in the future.
A survey of skilled South Africans should also include individual
entrepreneurs. The self-employed create jobs, add innovation and con-
tribute to the overall growth of the economy. Finally, such a survey
should also include not only people from the business or manufacturing
sector but also from science, technology, education and arts and culture.
These people also add value to the functional core of the economy by
training skilled workers, contributing technological and scientific inno-
vation or sustaining entertainment and tourist industries.
We therefore defined a “skilled” South African for the purposes of
this survey, as conforming to the following criteria:
• A South African citizen
• 20 years of age or older
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• Matriculated and possesses a Technikon diploma or University
degree from a recognized institution (or in their final year of studying
for a diploma or degree)
• Currently economically active (employed or looking for employ-
ment)
The only exceptions were people who either have not matriculated
from High School and/or graduated from a tertiary institutions, but who
nonetheless own a business or hold a senior management position in
their occupation: i.e. an owner, manager, supervisor, professional worker,
commercial farmer, or commissioned officer in the SANDF Permanent
Force.
This definition enables us to use the All Media and Products
(AMPS) Survey to estimate the actual size of this “skilled” population
group in South Africa. The AMPS Survey is conducted annually in
30,000 households nation-wide. Given the historical problems associat-
ed with census data in South Africa, it is often used as the basis for
demographic research and South Africa’s market research industry regu-
larly uses it to draw representative samples of the population.
Based on 1998 AMPS data, the economically active population in
South Africa is approximately 17,000,000. When we apply the criteria
of education and senior occupational status to the AMPS data, we esti-
mate the size of South Africa’s skilled sector at 1,600,000 (or 9% of the
economically active population).
In June-July 1998, we surveyed a random probability sample, strati-
fied by province, representative of this South African skilled popula-
tion. We conducted telephone interviews with 725 skilled South
Africans.
Household phone numbers were randomly selected from provincial
phone directories. Within each household contacted, all people who
met the criteria listed above were enumerated, and one was then ran-
domly selected. If no individual in the household met the requirements
(or if the selected person could not be interviewed after three call-
backs), another household was contacted until we reached our goal of
725. In the end, we made 4,250 phone calls to obtain 725 valid and
complete interviews.
Finally, in order to ensure the adequate inclusion of three small, but
important types of skills (engineers, accountants, and medical doctors),
we built quotas into our sampling strategy to ensure that we interviewed
at least 30 of each category. In the final analysis, we interviewed 54
engineers, 65 accountants and 36 medical doctors. The final realized
sample was then weighted according to the AMPS data. The final sam-
ple was thus representative of the South African skilled population
defined by our criteria.22
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The following section describes the responses of skilled South
Africans to a series of survey questions designed to assess the present
and potential extent of emigration. Then, we analyse the responses to a
series of question designed to assess a range of possible causes of emigra-
tion. Finally, using multivariate statistical analysis, we assess how well
this range of factors accounts for the propensity of skilled South
Africans to emigrate, as well as which factors are more or less important
in explaining emigration.
SOUTH AFRICA’S SKILLED POPULATION: A PROFILE
What does South Africa’s “skilled” population of 1.6 million look like?
Given the role of apartheid in reserving important positions in the econo-
my for whites, it is no surprise that the sample was predominantly white
(72%). But it is significant that 26% of the skilled sample are not: 18%
are African, 8% coloured and 3% Indian (Table 1.1). While we do not
have comparable data from earlier points, we suspect we have caught a
snapshot of a rapidly growing black skilled sector.23
In the rest of this report, we see many stark differences in the views
of skilled white and skilled black respondents (as well as some surprising
areas of similarity or consensus). However, because of the small number
of cases on which the results would be based, we do not report results of
coloured or Indian respondents as a sub-group – though their views are
present in results based on the total sample. Further research with these
populations is recommended.
Another possible surprise lies within the white sub-sample. Common
wisdom holds that Afrikaners virtually monopolized the political sphere
during apartheid, but that white English speakers retained extensive
control over business and industry. Yet almost half of the sample is com-
posed of white Afrikaners (Table 1.1).24
The skilled population of South Africa also appears to have more
women and younger people than expected. The black sub-sample is
younger than the white sub-sample, and is predominately female (where
the white sub-sample is predominately male) (Tables 1.2 and 1.3). The
skilled population is concentrat-
ed primarily in Gauteng
province, and also in Western
Cape and Kwazulu-Natal (Table
1.4).
Over 20% of the sample are
in households with a joint
monthly income of less than
R6 000 per month. However,
there are substantial racial 
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Table 1.1: Racial Breakdown of Sample
Population Group %
White (Afrikaans) 45
White (English) 27
Black 18
Coloured 5
Indian 3
Percentages may not add up to 100 in this and subse-
quent tables due to rounding (N=725)
differences. Almost three-quarters of skilled black respondents (71%)
have a joint, pre-tax, household income of R8 000 or less — the com-
parable white figure is 19% (Table 1.5).
Only 6% of the sample had less than a High School Certificate or
Matric pass (4% of white and 14% of black respondents). These people
are in the sample because they hold a managerial position in their occu-
pation. A further 21% had only a Matric pass or its equivalent. These
people were included either because they were in the final year of a
Technikon diploma or University Bachelors degree programme, or they
held a senior management position in their occupation. As for the rest,
three-fourths of the sample has a high school certificate plus either a
Technikon diploma or University Bachelor’s degree (Table 1.6).
Just under one-third (31%) of the sample are self-employed, full-time
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Table 1.2: Gender Breakdown of Skilled South Africans
Gender Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Male 61 66 36
Female 39 34 64
N=725
Table 1.3: Age Breakdown of Skilled South Africans
Age Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
18 to 24 6 5 8
25 to 34 29 28 36
35 to 49 45 45 43
Over 50 17 19 9
Won’t Say 2 2 4
N=725
Table 1.4: Province of Residence of Skilled South Africans
Province Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Gauteng 37 39 36
Western Cape 20 18 19
Kwazulu-Natal 13 12 17
Eastern Cape 7 7 7
Free State 6 6 6
North West 4 5 4
Northern Province 4 4 4
Mpumalanga 6 6 5
Northern Cape 3 4 3
N=725
entrepreneurs, either in the informal or formal sectors. Almost 60%
(57%) work full-time for someone else. Another 7% work part-time
either for themselves or someone else. A small percentage are 
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Table 1.5: Household Income of Skilled South Africans
Gross Monthly Household Income Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Less than R2 000 3 1 10
R2 001 to R6 000 19 9 52
R6 001 to R8 000 9 9 9
R8 001 to R10 000 11 12 8
R10 001 to 14 000 14 16 7
R14 001 to R20 000 15 19 1
R20 001 to R26 000 8 10 1
R26 001 to R32 000 3 4 0
R32 001 to R38 000 1 1 0
More than R38 000 4 4 0
Refused to answer 13 12 4
N=725
Table 1.6: Educational Qualifications of South Africans
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Less than High School Certificate (HSC) 6 4 14
HSC only, or equivalent 21 19 26
HSC plus diploma or Bachelor’s degree 58 60 56
Honours degree 9 10 6
Master’s degree 5 6 3
Doctorate 1 2 1
N=725
Table 1.7: Employment Status of Skilled South Africans
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Employed - Full time 57 58 58
Entrepreneur in Formal Sector - Full time 27 31 8
Entrepreneur in Informal Sector - Full time 4 3 7
Entrepreneur in Formal Sector - Part time 3 3 0
Employed - Part time 3 2 8
Final Year Student 3 2 8
Unemployed - looking for work 3 1 11
Entrepreneur in Informal Sector - Part time 1 0 1
N=725
unemployed but looking for work or do not yet have a diploma or
degree but are in the final year of tertiary studies (Table 1.7).
Finally, skilled South Africans are spread widely across a broad range
of economic sectors (Table 1.8). There are distinctive patterns of sec-
toral participation by race.
PREDICTING EMIGRATION: AN IMPRECISE SCIENCE
Predicting exactly how many skilled people will emigrate from South
Africa in the future is difficult. Even if a person says they want to leave,
there is no certainty that they actually will. In referring to who or how
many skilled people intend to emigrate, we therefore refer to an individ-
ual’s potential for emigration which is not the same thing as a firm predic-
tion of future emigration patterns and trends.
Emigration potential is a complex issue and consists of several differ-
ent elements:
• First, to what extent has a skilled person even considered the idea?
• Second, to what extent do they actually want to emigrate?
• Third, even if they want to leave South Africa, to what extent to
factors outside the person’s direct control (such as financial costs) affect
the likelihood of leaving?
• Fourth, exactly when do they plan to leave? There is a vast differ-
ence between those who have gone as far as setting some time deadline
for their move and those that have not. The longer one takes to make
the move, the more likely that other factors might come into play to
change the decision altogether.
• Lastly, a distinction must be drawn between temporary and perma-
nent movement (or emigration). It makes little sense to speak of a brain
drain if skilled people intend to return to South Africa after a short
period of time. This is especially the case where people may be leaving
to study in other countries. In many ways, this can actually constitute
an investment for the future of South Africa’s economic well-being
rather than a loss of skills. Permanent movement on the other hand is
clearly indicative of a brain drain.
Only when all of these questions are considered can we give a more
accurate estimate of the skilled emigration potential from South Africa
in the near future. The failure to adequately recognize these complexi-
ties can result in some extremely misleading conclusions and misinfor-
mation.
First of all, the survey asked about the degree of thought given to
leaving South Africa. It is safe to assume that those who have not
thought about the matter, at least at present, have no potential to
move. Thus, this question helps define the outermost limit of the pool
of South Africans who might conceivably leave. The pool is a large
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Table 1.8: Employment Sectors of Skilled South Africans
No. in % of Total % of % of
Sample* Whites Blacks
Education/Research 142 19 11 45
Secondary education 50 7 3 21
Primary education 47 6 3 17
Tertiary education 36 5 4 5
Research 9 1 1 2
Heavy Industry 111 15 14 7
Manufacturing 40 6 6 2
Textile 13 2 1 2
Construction 32 4 4 2
Mining 8 1 1 1
Automotive 10 1 1 0
Steel and Iron 8 1 1 0
Service Industry 110 14 12 12
Retail 54 7 6 8
Real estate 10 1 1 0
Energy 15 2 2 2
Food 13 2 2 0
Transport 14 2 1 2
Private Security 4 <0.5 0 0
Professional Practice 89 12 22 13
Medical 42 6 10 11
Engineering 31 4 10 2
Law firm 16 2 2 0
Finance/Banking 101 13 20 6
Accounting 39 5 12 3
Finance 32 4 4 3
Banking 20 3 3 0
Insurance 10 1 1 0
Government/Military 44 5 5 6
Government 34 4 4 5
Military 10 1 1 1
Agriculture 38 5 6 1
N=725  *Unweighted data. All percentages based on weighted data.
one. Over two-thirds (69%) say they have given the idea of emigration
some thought (and 38% say they have given it a “great deal” of
thought) (Table 1.9).
The popular perception of the brain drain is that it is a “white phe-
nomenon” only. But when the responses of skilled whites and blacks are
compared, there is a surprising level of similarity in attitudes, with 69%
of whites and 68% of blacks having given it at least some thought.
Some 33% of whites and 23% of blacks have given it a great deal of
thought, suggesting that the emigration potential is higher amongst
whites but far from insignificant amongst blacks.
These results were fairly similar to those obtained by a Sunday Times
readership questionnaire. In that survey, 74% said they “would consider
emigrating.” Yet those who bought the Sunday Times on 13 September
1998 were assailed with provocative banner front-page headlines pro-
claiming “74% with Skills Want to Quit South Africa.” These headlines
fueled a heated and unedifying debate involving President Mandela,
opposition parties and the news media. They were also highly mislead-
ing. This is because thinking about leaving is far from synonymous with
actually doing so. Regardless of whether people have thought about
leaving, to what extent to they actually wish to move? And, if they do
say they want to leave, have they thought seriously enough about it to
actually place some time frame on their exit?
The sample was therefore asked whether they would want to leave
South Africa on either a temporary or permanent basis (Table 1.10).
Following criteria laid out by the United Nations, we define a period of
more than two years as a permanent move (emigration). That said,
some skilled people might still wish to return to South Africa after liv-
ing and working in another country for, say, a period of five years. Thus,
what would be considered by international standards as permanent
movement, and thus emigration, might not be totally equivalent to a
permanent Brain Drain from South Africa — although it is certainly
true that the longer one resides in a new country the lower the proba-
bility of returning home.
It is clear that far fewer skilled people actually want to leave the
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Table 1.9: Consideration of Emigration
Thought given to moving to another Total % % of % of 
country to live and work: Whites Blacks
A great deal 31 33 23
Some 38 36 45
None at all 31 31 30
Don’t know 1 0 2
N=725
country than was implied by the Sunday Times headlines. While 69%
had given some thought to leaving, only 28% expressed a strong desire
to leave for a period of two years or more. While skilled black respon-
dents are less likely to say they want to leave for a period of more than
two years, it is still important to note that 16% do. When it comes to
the desire to leave for a period of two years or less, black South Africans
are actually more likely to want to do so.
How likely is it that the wish will become reality? Thinking about
leaving, and wanting to do it, are one thing. Actually doing it is quite
another. Emigration is a fairly complicated and difficult process where
people must look at a much broader range of physical and psychological
factors than sheer desire; factors such as costs, leaving family behind, and
the prospects that such a move will result in success. On the other hand,
it is plausible that the desire to emigrate is neither a sufficient nor a nec-
essary condition for emigration. For a range of reasons, such as percep-
tions of declining security or economic fortunes, people might feel they
have no choice and conclude that despite not wanting to leave it is the
most sensible decision for themselves and immediate family members.
To recap: 69% have given some thought to leaving, and 28% express
a strong desire to leave. Some 20% of skilled respondents say that it is
very likely that they would actually leave for a period of more than two
years (Table 1.11). Slightly higher proportions of skilled whites (22%)
than blacks (15%) say that a permanent move is very likely. On the
other hand, skilled blacks are more likely to leave South Africa on a
temporary basis (15%) than whites (10%). 
Because emigration is a formal, and often lengthy, process (e.g. get-
ting official documentation, preparing applications, organizing employ-
ment opportunities, as well as the sheer logistics of the move), people
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Table 1.10: Desire to Leave South Africa
Extent of desire to move temporarily to another country to live and work
(less than two years)
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Great 18 18 17
Some 27 24 40
Total 45 42 57
Extent of desire to move permanently to another country to live and work
(longer than two years)
Great 28 34 16
Some 28 28 38
Total 56 62 54
N=725
who have mentally set a specific date, or at least time frame, for leaving
are far more likely to act upon their desires than those who leave it as
an open-ended possibility. 
Table 1.12 illustrates the extent to which the sample has made a
mental commitment to emigrate within a specified time frame. It is evi-
dent that specifying a time frame cuts the levels of potential emigration
quite dramatically. Only 3% said that it was “quite likely” that they
would leave within six months, 5% say they will leave in the next two
years, and 13% say it is “very likely” that they will leave within five
years. The proportions of skilled blacks and whites who express a strong
probability of leaving within six months or within two years are statisti-
cally the same (though whites are more likely to express a strong proba-
bility of leaving within a five year time period). 
Possibly the firmest indicator of a person’s emigration potential is
whether they have actually begun the process of application for basic
emigration documentation (a formal requirement for any move to take
place). As of mid-1999, the proportions of skilled South Africans who
have begun this process is far lower than any of the other indicators
reviewed above (Table 1.13). Some 6% say they have applied for work
permits in another country, 5% have applied for permanent residence
elsewhere, and 3% had applied for foreign citizenship. Again, there are
no statistically significant differences between skilled white and black
South Africans. Taken together with the racial breakdowns in Table
1.12, this strongly suggests that, at the level of the very firmest indica-
tors of emigration, the same proportion of skilled blacks are presently
intending to leave the country as skilled whites. This is an aspect of the
Brain Drain that has enjoyed no public or government awareness and
profile.
How do these various components of the emigration decision fit
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Table 1.11: Likelihood of Leaving South Africa 
Likelihood of ever moving temporarily to another country to live and work
(less than two years):
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Very Likely 11 10 15
Likely 21 16 39
Total 32 26 54
Likelihood of ever moving permanently to another country to live and work
(longer than two years):
Very Likely 20 22 14
Likely 29 29 27
Total 49 51 41
N=725
together? Figure 3 reveals the consistent decline in indicators of likely
emigration as we move from consideration, to desire, to likelihood, and
to specified, increasingly shorter time periods. Thus, as greater amounts
of mental and physical commitments are required from the respondent,
emigration potential declines sharply.
In order to test if the responses can be combined into a single valid
index that reliably summarizes each person’s potential to emigrate, we
used a statistical procedure known as Factor Analysis. Factor Analysis
examines the similarity or dissimilarity in patterns of responses to a
range of question items to determine whether respondents were reacting
to them in common ways. If they are, we can infer that the various
questions capture different elements of a common underlying dimen-
sion, and can thus aggregate these responses to these questions into a
single index.
The analysis does not include data on applications for work permits
etc. This is a consequence of the decision to leave rather than indica-
tors of the probability of reaching that decision. Factor Analysis con-
firmed that responses to four questions (desire to move for two years or
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Table 1.12: Commitment to Emigrate 
Likelihood of leaving South Africa: Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
In the next 6 months
Very likely 3 3 2
Likely 4 2 10
Total 7 5 12
In the next 2 years
Very likely 5 5 3
Likely 20 20 22
Total 25 25 25
In the next 5 years
Very likely 13 15 8
Likely 29 27 33
Total 42 42 41
N=725
Table 1.13: Applications for Emigration Documentation
Applied for: Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Work permit in another country 6 6 5
Permanent residency in another country 5 5 4
Foreign citizenship 3 3 3
N=725
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more, the likelihood of moving for two years or more, likelihood of
moving within two years, and likelihood of moving within five years)
formed a valid and reliable index that measures a skilled person’s emi-
gration potential. Questions about whether people had considered mov-
ing, and whether they would move in the next six months, did not fit
into this index because the pattern of responses to these questions were
significantly different to the consistent pattern of responses that people
gave to the other four items. 
We then calculated index scores for each respondent by looking at
their average score across the four key questions. Since each of the
items has a four point score, the range of the average index scores also
runs from 1 to 4. Those who score “4” (i.e. said “very willing” or “very
likely” to all four items) were classified as having a “very high” probabil-
ity of leaving. Those who scored between 3.75 and 3.25 (or who gave
some combination of very intense and intense replies) were classified as
having a “high” probability and so on.
Once an index score is calculated for each skilled respondent, the
following conclusions emerge:
• 2% of the sample fall into the “very high” category of emigration
potential (of leaving South Africa for a period of two years or more,
within the next two to five years).
• 10% have a “high” emigration potential
• 25% have a “moderate” emigration potential
• 28% have a “low” emigration potential
• 16% have a “very low” emigration potential
• 20% have “no” emigration potential at all
Thus, if only those skilled South Africans with a “very high” emigra-
tion potential left the country in the next five years, this would trans-
late into a potential gross loss of around 32,000 skilled people in the
next five years (2% of a skilled population estimated at 1.6 million).
Taking into account the margin of error in surveys of this sample size,
that number could be as low as 6,000 or as high as 58,000. If all of those
with a high or very high potential left, the number would jump to a
massive 192,000. With margin of error, this could range from 155,000 to
as high as 229,000 in the next five years.
To place these estimates in perspective, the recent SANSA report
estimates that 43,000 “professionals” (which they admit excludes a
number of other skilled categories, such as managers) have emigrated to
the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the past nine years
(based on immigration statistics in those countries). Overall, they claim
that 233,000 have emigrated during that period, though they suggest
that very high proportions of these would be skilled.25
These are estimates of gross skilled emigration or “gross loss.” Any
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complete estimate of the brain drain, or “net loss” of skilled workers also
needs to take into account the potential counter-balancing impact of
skilled foreigners that enter South Africa. But SANSA estimates that
“professional” immigration to South Africa in the past nine years
amounts to no more than 10,000.26
The Emigration Potential index suggests that the popular assumption
that skilled emigration is a “white” phenomenon is a grave misconcep-
tion. There is absolutely no difference in the proportion of skilled
whites and blacks who fall into the “very high” category (2% of either
group). It is true that a higher proportion of skilled whites (11%) than
skilled blacks (4%) fall into the “high” probability category. But adding
the two together, the difference in proportions of skilled whites (13%)
than skilled blacks (6%) with a high/very high probability of leaving the
country within five years, is not nearly as great as might be expected.
THE NATURE OF SKILLED EMIGRATION FROM SOUTH AFRICA
If skilled respondents with a “high” or “very high” emigration poten-
tial do leave, where will they go? And will they completely sever all
links with South Africa? This section reports the responses of those
with a “very high” or “high” emigration potential.
Table 1.14 displays the top five most likely countries of destination.
Overall, the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand
and Canada rank as the five most often mentioned destinations. These
preferences confirm the spatial patterns of previous skilled emigrant des-
tinations reported by SANSA.27
While the popular image of the “Brain Drain” involves people cut-
ting all ties with South Africa, this is not necessarily accurate. People
may, for a range of reasons, intend to return at some stage in the future.
Even where such a return is not expressly foreseen, uncertainty about
what the future holds might also limit the extent to which ties are cut.
Table 1.15 reveals that the vast majority of those likely to leave in the
next five years say they would want to stay away for more than five
years. At the same time, only one-in-ten say they would never return
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Table 1.14: Intended Destination of Emigrants
Most likely country: %
United States of America 24 
Australia 22
United Kingdom 15
New Zealand 12
Canada 11
N=87
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home. Almost 70% say they would return at least once a year or more.
Emigration involves decisions about property, savings, investments,
and ultimately, citizenship. The willingness to relinquish these things is
a far better indicator of the nature of return intentions. A willingness to
cut all these ties indicates a strong certainty of no return. Between 80%
and 90% of likely skilled emigrants are willing to cut all economic ties
with the country (e.g. sell their house, take out savings and invest-
ments). A significant proportion (57%) is willing to give up South
African citizenship (Table 1.16). Hence the permanence of the poten-
tial move is strong.
Yet not all likely emigrants are completely sold on putting down
deep roots in their likely country of destination. Some 36% say they do
not want permanent residence, 40% do not want citizenship, and only
half give indications of a life-time stay by saying they want to retire, or
be buried there.
THE DECISION TO EMIGRATE
While we now have a clearer picture of the potential extent of South
Africa’s brain drain, the other important question is what differentiates
skilled people who express a high potential to emigrate from those who
do not? The survey identified a range of key factors that are generally
seen to play pivotal roles in encouraging skilled people to emigrate.
Table 1.15: Duration of Emigration
Length of stay at most likely destination: %
Less than 6 months 1
6 months to 1 year 2
1 to 2 years 8
2 to 5 years 14
More than 5 years 71
Don’t know 4
Frequency of return: %
Weekly 0
Monthly 4
Once every few months 7
Yearly 57
Once every few years 20
Never 12
Don’t Know 2
N=87
DECLINING QUALITY OF LIFE
Dissatisfaction with overall “quality of life” is often cited as an important
factor that “pushes” skilled South Africans out of the country. Indeed, the
common wisdom is that the South African Brain Drain is heavily driven
by white perceptions of a deteriorating quality of life since the demise of
apartheid.
Skilled South Africans were therefore asked about their level of sat-
isfaction with a wide variety of measures of “quality of life.” Factor
Analysis demonstrated that people did not simply respond to all these
items in the same way, but rather, had different patterns of reactions to
different clusters of questions. The following discussion is organized
according to the findings of the Factor Analysis. There are high levels
of dissatisfaction with (a) the cost of living, (b) levels of taxation, (c)
safety and security, and (d) the standard of public and commercial ser-
vices in South Africa. In each of these cases (with the exception of
standard of services), dissatisfaction extends across racial boundaries and
is not a predominantly white pre-occupation (Table 1.17).
Interestingly, evaluations of their children’s futures is statistically
more closely related to how they rate specific public and commercial
services, rather than to issues of safety, cost of living, schools or health
care. We interpret the questions on public and commercial services as
tapping what many refer to as the issue of “declining standards.” Thus,
skilled people seem to think about the future of their children in much
the same way as they view the question of “standards.”
In contrast, skilled South Africans are far less dissatisfied with per-
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Table 1.16: Links with South Africa
Total %
Willingness to sell house in South Africa:
Very willing 35
Willing 46
Willingness to take all savings out of South Africa:
Very willing 49
Willing 40
Willingness to take all investments out of South Africa:
Very willing 42
Willing 42
Willingness to give up South African citizenship:
Very willing 23
Willing 34
N=87
sonal economic conditions as well as with schools and available health
care. The single exception is black dissatisfaction with current income
levels, which is understandable given the relatively low income levels
enjoyed by skilled black respondents.
More important than people’s absolute assessment of conditions is
the relative judgment they make when comparing their own conditions
to those of others. For the most part, skilled South Africans do not
exhibit high levels of dissatisfaction with their relative situation. They
seem to understand that they, as skilled persons, are better off than the
bulk of their fellow citizens, or others in their race or language group.
Yet, they also do not see themselves as doing worse than other people of
the same economic status, or others in their same profession (Table
1.18).
While skilled South Africans are more likely to think that their “in-
group” (i.e. own race group, language group, profession, economic class)
is doing worse than other groups in the country, these levels are still
very low. Remarkably, only a minority of skilled blacks think that blacks
as a group, or those who share their home language, are doing worse
28
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Table 1.17: Satisfaction with Quality of Life in South Africa
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Dissatisfied or Very dissatisfied with:
Cost of Living 71 72 64
Present level of taxation 74 75 74
Relative share of taxes paid in 59 59 59
comparison to others
Personal safety 66 65 61
Family’s safety 68 69 54
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g. parks, 70 79 37
beaches, toilets)
Customer service 56 65 27
Future of children in South Africa 55 61 29
Availability of affordable/quality products 28 29 31
Job 23 18 39
Security of job 26 20 44
Level of income 37 30 60
Prospects for professional advancement 30 32 35
Ability to find the house wanted 21 17 37
Ability to find a good school for children 27 27 27
Ability to find medical services for family 21 19 23
N=725
than other groups in the country. Nationally representative samples of
ordinary black South Africans also find surprisingly low perceptions of
relative deprivation.28
We see far higher levels of relative dissatisfaction among skilled whites
when we ask them to compare their lives today versus five years ago.
Some 65% of skilled whites say their lives have got worse in the previous
five years. In stark contrast, 65% of skilled blacks say life has got better.
Regardless of where things are now, skilled South Africans do tend
to feel that conditions will only get worse (Table 1.19). They are partic-
ularly pessimistic about their future cost of living, levels of taxation and
safety, and the standard of public services. Again, this pessimism
extends across the racial divide. Pessimism about personal economic
futures and the availability of quality medical services and good schools
is less severe, though still significant. Along with their views on the
standard of services and the future of their children, skilled blacks are,
in fact, relatively optimistic about the future of their personal economic
conditions and their future ability to find quality education and health
care for their family.
THE POLITICAL SITUATION
Internationally, a great deal of contemporary migration is related to
aspects of the political arena; the most well known politically-motivated
migration is the flight from oppression and persecution, or political tur-
moil and instability. However, the impact of political factors on skilled
people may take different forms. Due to their higher mobility, skilled 
people may have a lower threshold of sensitivity and thus react not only
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Table 1.18: Relative Dissatisfaction with Quality of Life
Total % Yes % of Whites % of Blacks
Overall personal economic conditions are worse or much worse than:
Other South Africans 6 5 8
Other people in your race group 9 9 11
Other people who share your language 7 6 8
Other people in your profession 8 8 8
Other people in your economic class 9 9 11
Overall conditions of in-group are worse or much worse than the following:
People of your race 22 22 19
People who share your language 20 21 17
People in your profession 14 14 11
People in your economic class 15 15 12
N=725
to oppressive government, but also to unsatisfactory or disagreeable gov-
ernment and policies. A declining faith in the political system or a dis-
trust of the government of the day may similarly precipitate emigration to
countries with more attractive political environments.
The survey probed several different political issues. Factor Analysis
indicated that the responses to these questions could be clustered into a
smaller set of separate issues expressed in Tables 1.20. Skilled whites are
highly dissatisfied with government performance, feel that it does not
represent them and distrust government. Skilled blacks have far less
pessimistic views across these indicators.
While skilled whites feel that government is largely uninterested in
their opinions, and give government a very low approval rating (Table
1.20), most feel that the actions of government have been detrimental to
them personally and to whites more generally. Skilled blacks in marked
contrast, give government a high approval rating and look with favour on
its actions. Interestingly, perceptions of the fairness of government are
quite similar. There is not much comfort for government here; over 50%
of skilled South Africans of both race groups find government unfair in its
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Table 1.19: Perceptions of Future Conditions in South Africa 
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Do you expect the following to get worse or much worse in the next 5 years?
Cost of living 78 85 51
Your present level of taxation 79 83 69
Your relative share of taxes in 70 77 56
comparison to others
Your personal safety 75 81 54
Your family’s safety 76 82 53
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g. parks, 70 83 23
beaches, toilets)
Customer service 59 71 20
Future of your children 60 71 22
Availability of affordable products 50 58 26
Job 40 42 33
Job Security 38 39 35
Your level of income 40 44 39
Prospects for professional advancement 38 41 39
Ability to find a desirable house to live in 35 38 30
Ability to find a good school for children 52 61 21
Ability to find medical services for family 43 60 20
N=725
treatment of themselves and their race, class and language group.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A final political issue widely cited in public debate as a factor “pushing”
skilled whites out of the country is the government’s affirmative action
policy. The results confirm that skilled whites are widely opposed to this
policy (83%) while only 20% of skilled blacks express similar views
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Table 1.20: Perception of Government by Skilled South Africans
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Approval Rating:
Do you approve of the way the national 29 17 67
government has performed its job over the 
last year? (% approve/strongly approve)
How much of the time can you trust 18 7 62
government to do what is right 
(% all of the time)
How interested do you think the govern- 27 15 74
ment is in hearing what people like you 
think? (% very interested/quite interested)
Responsiveness of Government:
Interest of government in the opinions of (% yes):
People of my race group 23 22 82
People in my economic class 43 23 77
People who share my language 37 16 80
Impact of Government:
Impact of the actions of the government over the last year 
(% positive or very positive):
Personally 41 29 75
On people of same race 27 14 73
On people who share same language 29 18 71
On people in same economic class 36 26 76
On South Africa 32 10 76
Discrimination by Government
Extent to which the following are treated unfairly by government
(% always or to a large extent):
People of my race group 42 42 47
People who share my language 43 43 49
People in my economic class 36 34 46
Me personally 33 31 46
N=725
(Table 1.21). Given that they are the primary beneficiaries of the policy,
the high level of support amongst black is unsurprising. What is striking,
though, is the pervasiveness and strength of white opposition to affirma-
tive action. The general arguments for affirmative action (right of past
wrongs) clearly have little resonance for whites.
GREEN GRASS ON THE OTHER SIDE?
After establishing which country would be their most likely destination if
they left South Africa, respondents were asked to compare the two.
Substantial numbers of skilled South Africans clearly see greener pastures
abroad (Table 1.22). In general, they are consistently more likely to think
that conditions abroad are better. Especially attractive, when compared to
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Table 1.21: Attitudes of Skilled South Africans to Affirmative Action
% of Whites % of Blacks
Strongly oppose 42 6
Oppose 41 14
Total 83 20
N=725
Table 1.22: Comparison Between South Africa and Overseas Destination
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Better or much better overseas:
Personal safety 80 86 55
Family safety 80 86 53
Upkeep of public amenities 72 81 32
Medical services 59 66 27
Availability of quality affordable products 62 69 34
Customer service 67 76 36
Level of taxation 61 64 46
Taxation 52 57 28
Cost of living 54 55 38
Job 43 48 42
Prospects for professional advancement 49 49 46
Job security 52 53 46
Level of income 60 61 52
Ability to find desirable house 28 25 30
Ability to find a good school for children 53 56 38
Future of children 65 73 32
N=725
South Africa, are the safety and security situation, standard of services,
levels of taxation, schools, health care and children’s future prospects.
Skilled blacks are much less likely to see conditions abroad as better
than in South Africa, yet they are just as likely as whites to feel that
people who have left South Africa have led improved lives. Skilled
blacks are also just as likely as skilled whites to feel that they personally
would improve their lives better by moving to other parts of the world.
NETWORKS AND LOGISTICS
There are a whole other set of factors dealing with “networks” and “logis-
tics” that can also affect a decision to go or stay. The degree to which
people think conditions are better in another country, for example, may
depend upon their knowledge of other countries, or their personal contact
with people in those countries. For example, the perceived physical and
emotional ease of emigration may vary depending upon whether someone
has close contacts in the country of destination who can help them man-
age their entry into their new world. This is probably even more impor-
tant among skilled populations. Because of the growth in international
communications, skilled people are more likely to have access to greater
information about other places in the world. 
There are also a host of logistical factors to consider. Regardless of
how green the grass appears on the other side, a person will not emi-
grate if they cannot afford to get over the fence. Because of their greater
material stake in their home countries, skilled people are more likely to
weigh the costs of uprooting and moving.
Skilled South Africans in fact have relatively low levels of direct, reg-
ular contact with people or firms in foreign destinations. Very few people
regularly travel outside the country (Table 1.23). Few (15%) whites and
only 2% of blacks have worked for foreign companies or clients overseas.
While around one-quarter (27%) say they are in regular contact (at least
once every few months) with professional associations abroad, only 15%
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Table 1.23: Experience of Regular Travel Abroad
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Travel once a year or more to:
Southern Africa 16 18 9
Elsewhere in Africa 3 3 5
Europe 7 9 3
North America 3 4 2
Australia/New Zealand 2 1 1
Asia 1 1 1
N=725
have regular contact with fellow professionals abroad, and an even small-
er proportion (7%) with foreign employment agencies. 
However, significant proportions of skilled South Africans, especially
whites, have been touched by emigration in very direct ways. One-fifth
of skilled whites (20%) say a member of their immediate family has left
to live and work abroad, and one-third (36%) say a member of the
extended family has left. As many as 59% know a close friend who has
left. In the professional environment, 40% say they have lost a co-worker,
and 57% say someone they know in their profession has left (Table 1.24).
Prior exposure to emigration increases the probability of leaving (by
reducing the unknown), but also means that there is the beginning of a
personal network somewhere overseas. Between one-fifth to one-third
of skilled South Africans say they “often” receive information about liv-
ing conditions in other countries from a range of different sources (fam-
ily, friends, newspapers, professional associations and professional jour-
nals). Between one-fifth and one-quarter say they “often” get informa-
tion about job opportunities in other countries through these sources.
In order to assess the degree to which emigration is logistically feasi-
ble for skilled South Africans, we asked how easy it would be for them
to leave South Africa to go and work and live in another country, and
whether they felt that moving and finding a new home would be afford-
able. Significant proportions of skilled South Africans see few logistical
obstacles to emigration. Over one third (37%) say it would be “easy” or
“very easy” for them to leave, and 42% think they would be able to
afford the costs of moving and finding a new home.
CONCLUSION: STEMMING THE TIDE?
This study shows that 2% of skilled South Africans have a “very
high” emigration potential, and another 10% have a “high” potential to
leave in the next five years. A much higher proportion still have
thought about emigrating. What do the findings of this survey imply for
possible strategies to keep skilled South Africans in the country?
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Table 1.24: Knowledge of Other Emigrants
Total % % of Whites % of Blacks
Knows at least one emigrant amongst:
Members of immediate family 19 20 11
Members of extended family 36 40 14
Close friends 59 69 17
Co-workers 40 45 14
People in profession known personally 57 66 19
N=725
Whether the grass is actually greener abroad is an open yet answer-
able question. However, such research might be a useful way for govern-
ment and civil society to create a better, more realistic understanding
among skilled South Africans of what things are really like in other
countries, especially the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and the United Kingdom. It is important to remember that skilled
South Africans have very little experience with foreign employers and
very little first hand experience of these countries (at least in the form
of regular travel).
One other way of testing whether there is something that govern-
ment can do, or at least avoid doing, in order to keep as many potential
leavers in the country as possible is to examine the responses of those
10% of skilled workers with a “high” emigration potential on two spe-
cific questions.
First of all, they were asked what, if anything, would lead them to
stay in South Africa. Only 12% of those with a “high” emigration
potential said that there was “nothing” that could make them stay. One
quarter (25%) said improvements in safety and security would make
them stay (Table 1.25).
Finally, we asked the entire sample whether potential government
steps to restrict emigration would make them more or less likely to
leave. From the responses of those with a “high” emigration potential,
we see that government policies to make emigration more difficult
would be counter-productive and hasten the exit of almost half of this
group. Other specific steps such as requiring a year’s national service
from students leaving professional schools, an end to dual passport hold-
ing, or increased fees for documents would also hasten the exit of
between one-third to one-quarter of this group.
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Table 1.25: Factors Affecting a Decision to Leave South Africa
Total %
Most important factor causing person to stay:
Improvement in safety and security 25
Family roots 15
Nothing 12
Future of children in country 7
Climate/weather/nature 5
Better government 3
Patriotism 3
Good schools 3
Job security 3
N=59
CHAPTER TWO
DEALING IN SCARCE SKILLS: 
EMPLOYER RESPONSES TO THE BRAIN DRAIN
C.M. AND J.M. ROGERSON
INTRODUCTION
L
ittle concrete information exists on the actual shortages expe-
rienced by different types of employers in the South African
economy or how these different types of employers are
addressing the question of specific skills shortages. Yet the
answers to these questions have potentially important policy
implications for the design of new immigration policies in South Africa.
The policy importance of high level skills recruitment is underlined in
the context of globalizing labour markets and of growing international
competition for select groups of high skilled workers, such as medical
personnel, chartered accountants or computing specialists. In virtually
all the leading South African Sunday newspapers there are regular
advertisements by an increasing number of international companies,
personnel consultancies or recruitment agencies seeking to attract
South African human resources to Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand. The arrival and growth in South Africa of a new
industry of immigration consultants and lawyers are further testament to
the dangers posed for the country of globalizing labour markets.
The objective in this chapter is to present the findings of a detailed
investigation into responses to the brain drain by employers of skilled
personnel in South Africa. The survey sample of 200 enterprises was
designed to be as representative as possible of employers across the spec-
trum of the public and private sectors. Findings from this survey are sup-
plemented by material drawn from the business and technical press. The
research was undertaken during March-September 1998. Overall, the
investigation was (a) designed to identify the scale and types of skills
shortages which presently exist in South Africa and (b) to assess the
hiring practices, attitudes and responses of enterprises dealing with skills
shortages in key areas of the economy.
The findings are analysed in four sections. First, the research
methodology is detailed. Second, a profile of the skills pool of major
South African employers is developed to highlight areas of skills short-
age, both immediate and anticipated. Then the focus shifts to how
South African employers are dealing with skill shortages. Key issues of
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concern include their attempts to deal locally with these shortages, to
source skilled personnel from outside South Africa and the recruitment
problems encountered with the Department of Home Affairs. In the
concluding section of the report, the policy implications of the research
findings are identified.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In seeking to construct a profile of the skills pool and of skills short-
ages in the South African labour market, a questionnaire was designed
and administered to a representative sample of South African employers
of skilled personnel. The interview was targeted at senior administrative
personnel, normally the human resource manager or personnel manager,
of major employers of skilled personnel. The interview schedule includ-
ed a mixture of closed and open ended questions. Key themes included
an analysis of an enterprise’s skilled workforce, current skills shortages,
recruitment and training practices for coping with a loss of skilled per-
sonnel, and attitudes towards migration policies in South Africa.
The definition of “skilled personnel” is contested in the internation-
al literature with various definitions based on educational levels and
occupational status. A typology of skilled international migrants has
been constructed by Gould in which a useful distinction is drawn
between circulatory movements (for example, managers within multina-
tional companies) and permanent migration (resulting in brain drain).29
Although the term “skilled personnel” is a slippery concept, it generally
includes the following occupational categories: high-level and general
managers; scientists, engineers and those with professional technical
skills; professionals in education, health and welfare; professionals in
administration; and, professionals in literature, arts and sport.30 In more
recent analyses, the occupational category of computer and IT special-
ists is included as a separate category. Finally, in the developing world
context, the category of high-skilled personnel also includes other occu-
pational groups, including certain blue-collar technical workers.31 These
guidelines from international research provide the basic definition of
“skilled personnel” used in this investigation. Nevertheless, in this sur-
vey employers were not asked to follow a single definition of “skilled”
employees.
The sample of 200 enterprises was designed to represent the key
employers in the South African economy for whom the question of
skilled labour supply is important. The starting point was the various
sets of listings of major South African companies compiled annually in
the Financial Mail Top Companies Survey. This source provides a rank-
ing of leading enterprises on the basis of their asset base or market capi-
talisation on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). As these listings
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primarily focus on listed companies on the JSE, it was necessary to sup-
plement this initial source with additional company data and listings of
enterprises.
Other sources used were the University of South Africa Bureau of
Market Research Industrial Register for manufacturing enterprises and a
range of special sectoral surveys conducted by Engineering News. By
drawing from these alternative sources we included groups of major for-
eign multinationals operating in South Africa and smaller (often niche)
enterprises not always captured in listings such as the Financial Mail
Top Companies Survey. Finally, the sample included a group of public
sector or parastatal employers operating in various sectors of the econo-
my, in particular education, health, and finance.
The final sample consisted of a range of different sectors, sizes of
enterprises (as defined both by their asset base and numbers of employ-
ees) and ownership structures (public sector vs private sector, foreign
companies vs. local enterprises).32
The activities undertaken by the enterprises span the key non-agri-
cultural sectors of the economy. Table 2.1 shows the sectoral identifica-
tion of the 200 enterprises. The largest category, 56% of the total, was
manufacturing or industrial enterprise.
Table 2.2 indicates the different types of manufacturing enterprises
included in the sample. The major group of industrial enterprises fall into
the classification of high technology manufacturers. The specific types of
manufacturing activity captured by the term “high technology” include
producers of electrical and industrial machinery; other machinery; radio,
television and communications equipment; pharmaceuticals; scientific
instruments; and office, computing and accounting machinery.33
The strong representation of industrial enterprises in the sample was
the result of a decision to target high-technology enterprises as a category
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Table 2.1 Sectoral Breakdown of the Sample
Sector Number of Companies
Mining 6
Computers & I.T. 14
Hi-tech industry 69
Other industry 47
Construction 7
Tourism and entertainment 13
Banking and finance 8
Business services 19
Education and health 17
TOTAL 200
with special needs for highly skilled personnel. The term “high technolo-
gy” can be applied to both high-technology manufacturing and to com-
puter, service and IT support enterprises. In total, 69 of the 116 industrial
enterprises would be classified as high-technology, alongside a group of 14
computer and service enterprises. This means that a total of 83 (41.5 %)
high technology enterprises were included in the sample.
Outside the high technology sector, the survey sought to capture the
skills situation and shortages of a cross-section of enterprises in several
other areas of the South African economy, including mining, construc-
tion, tourism and entertainment, banking and finance, business services,
computers and information technology and, education and health.
Table 2.3 reveals that the sample included enterprises with a range of
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Table 2.2: Breakdown of the Industrial Sector Companies
Number of Companies
High-tech industrial sector
Pharmaceuticals 13
Other hi-tech industry 56
Other industrial
Food (7) and beverages (1) 8
Textiles and clothing (2); footwear (1) 3
Furniture 5
Paper, printing and publishing 6
Chemicals and rubber, and plastics 9
Pottery & glass 2
Metals, engineering and transport 14
TOTAL 116
Table 2.3: Large Enterprises with More Than 300 Employees
Sector Number of % of Sector 
Companies Sample
Mining 5 83
Computers & I.T. 2 14
Hi-tech industry 19 28
Other industry 32 68
Construction 5 71
Tourism and entertainment 2 15
Banking and finance 8 100
Business services 5 26
Education and health 10 59
TOTAL 88 100
sizes. Special concern was centred upon the needs and issues of large
employers (defined as a minimum of 300 employees). Among the group
of 88 large enterprises were a number of giant organizations such as
Standard Bank, First National Bank, Old Mutual, Sappi, Sasol, AECI,
and the Premier Group. The major large enterprises were leading indus-
trial companies such as Nestle, 3M, Volkswagen, Hoechst, Bayer,
Billiton and Dorbyl.
In total 88 (44 percent of the sample) firms are classed as large
enterprises. Manufacturing enterprises, which comprised 58% of the over-
all sample also formed 58% of the group of large labour employers. In cer-
tain sectors, such as banking and finance, education and health, and min-
ing, a high proportion of the interviewed enterprises could be classed as
large. By contrast, in sectors such as business services, computing and
information technology, tourism and entertainment, the majority of
enterprises are medium-sized (between 51-299 employees) enterprises.
The survey sample also included a range of medium and specialist
small-sized enterprises. Many of these medium- and small-sized enter-
prises were clustered outside the industrial sector in activities such as IT
support and business services (accounting, law, advertising, broking).
In terms of ownership structure, the sample included 16 public sector
and 184 private sector enterprises. Public sector enterprises included a
number of major universities, a provincial department of health, the
Development Bank of Southern Africa and newer government organiza-
tions such as Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency.
The division between foreign and local ownership is shown in Table
2.4. The sample captured foreign companies operating across several
sectors of the South African economy. In total, foreign enterprises rep-
resented 27.5% of the sample.
The majority of interviews were conducted through a telephone 
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Table 2.4: Number of Foreign and Local Companies
Sector Foreign Local
Mining 1 5
Computers & IT 4 10
Hi-tech industry 29 40
Other industry 12 35
Construction 0 7
Tourism and entertainment 1 12
Banking and finance 0 8
Business services 8 11
Education and health 0 17
Total 55 145
survey lasting up to 40 minutes. The average length of interview was
between 15-20 minutes. The interview was undertaken with senior per-
sonnel available and knowledgeable about the personnel and human
resources of their enterprises. To obtain a satisfactory interview
response, multiple contacts with enterprises were often required. In
some instances ten or more telephone calls were made to secure an
interview. Where enterprises requested a faxed interview schedule this
was done, although the response rate was extremely poor (2 replies out
of nearly 30 faxed questionnaires).
The majority of enterprises responded in a cooperative and positive
fashion. But certain problems were experienced in the interview process
and these should be noted.
With several private large conglomerate or multi-divisional enterpris-
es, it was difficult to find an individual with the appropriate knowledge to
speak on behalf of the enterprise as a whole. High profile examples of this
problem included Anglo-American and South African Breweries. Often,
therefore, the interview focussed on particular divisions within the enter-
prise that were focal points for the employment of high skilled personnel.
Commonly, human resource or personnel managers were genuinely
unable to provide detailed statistical information about different cate-
gories of skills within enterprises. Once again, large enterprises were a
particular problem. Instead of quantitative information, qualitative
responses were elicited in several elements of the interview schedule. A
small but not insignificant problem in interviews with larger enterprises
was the fact that certain human resource or personnel managers did not
have the experience to answer all questions.
Special problems arose in securing information from public sector
employers, especially in the health sector. We had hoped to interview
several provincial departments of health and education concerning the
well-publicised and documented departure of their personnel.
Regrettably, this was not possible as requests for interviews were con-
stantly referred back to national departments in Pretoria, from which no
meaningful response could be obtained.
Finally, there was no cooperation whatsoever from a small segment
of the targeted individuals or enterprise. Despite assurances of confiden-
tiality, refusal to participate was encountered from senior personnel in
Coca Cola, Eskom and Simba. Most remarkable of all for a survey of
this nature, was the complete lack of cooperation from South Africa’s
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), a parastatal body
with major responsibility for issues relating to high-level personnel
planning in South Africa. Although the non-cooperation encountered
was regrettable, it in no way reduces the validity of the results of this
investigation.
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The final sample of 200 enterprises is a representative cross-section
of the spectrum of employers of skilled personnel in South Africa. In
particular, the survey captures a cross-section of enterprises from a range
of different sectors, of different sizes and with different ownership char-
acteristics. It includes a set of enterprises, private and public sector, for-
eign and local, which are leaders in the market for high skilled person-
nel in South Africa. Besides those individual enterprises already named,
the sample included the following: De Beers, Samancor, Microsoft, Q
Data, Acer, Unisys, Log-Tek, TML Media, General Electric, Samsung,
Sulzer, Panasonic, Bridgestone, Roche, Revlon, Reebok, Otis, Dorbyl,
LTA, Stocks and Stocks, Rand Merchant Bank, Investec, Arthur
Andersen, SBC Warburg, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Kessell Feinstein,
Young and Rubicon, Hunt Lascaris, KPMG, SATOUR, the
Morningside Clinic, Rand Clinic, and the Universities of
Witwatersrand, Cape Town, South Africa, and Pretoria.
HIGH SKILLS: LOCAL OR FOREIGN?
In this section, the patterns and profile of the high skills base is
unpacked. This is followed by an examination of the impact of emerging
skills shortages.
In total, the 200 enterprises employ an estimated 101,000 skilled
personnel with the largest absolute numbers in banking and finance,
education and health, and industrial. The sectors with the lowest
absolute numbers of skilled personnel were entertainment and tourism,
and construction. In some respects, however, these figures are mislead-
ing for they fail to take into consideration the total number of employ-
ees in particular sectors of the economy.
A better indicator of the relative importance of skilled personnel in
different sectors of the South African economy is a comparison of the
numbers of skilled workers in relation to the total workforce of individ-
ual enterprises. Table 2.5 shows the proportion of skilled workers in
relation to total employment in the sample enterprises. Of the 193
enterprises for which information was available, 39% of enterprises have
50% of more of their employees classed as skilled personnel and 20% of
enterprises have a share of 75% or more of their workforce so classed.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, 38% of enterprises have only 25%
of their workforce classed as skilled personnel and 17% have less than
10% of the total.
It is evident that there are important sectoral variations in the
employment and relative significance of skilled personnel in relation to
the total workforce. Across the nine sectors captured in the survey it is
possible to identify four sectors in which the ratio of skilled personnel
to total employment is especially high. These four sectors are, in rank
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order, education and health (in which skilled personnel represents at
least 50% of the total workforce for 94% of enterprises), business ser-
vices (74%), banking and finance (71%) and computers and IT services
(71%). For these four sectors the proportion of enterprises with over
75% skilled personnel is a significant indicator of major pockets of
skilled workers in the South African economy.
The most high skills intensive sectors were found, in rank order, to
be computers and IT services (57%), business services (47%), education
and health (41%) and banking and finance (29%). In total, these four
sectors accounted for 78 000 skilled employees, the major numerical
segment of the survey. In several computer services and IT enterprises
the proportion of the labour force that was classified as high skilled was
as large as 90% or more. Such examples of high skilled personnel were
also recorded in the business services and education and health sectors.
Five sectors recorded shares of skilled workers below the sample
average (Table 2.5): mining, other industrial, entertainment and
tourism, industrial high tech and construction. In total, these five sec-
tors accounted for approximately 23 000 skilled personnel in the sur-
veyed enterprises. There were still many enterprises, particularly in the
industrial high tech sector, in which the proportion of skilled personnel
was 75% or more (see Table 2.5).
The number of companies employing non-South African and South
African high skilled personnel is shown in Table 2.6. The most striking
finding is that over half employ a skilled workforce of citizens or perma-
nent residents alone. Some 46.5% employ foreign high skilled workers.
Some sectoral variations are again in evidence. The highest proportions
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Table 2.5: Skilled Workers as a Proportion of the Total Labour Force
Sector No. of Companies in Each Category
<25% 25-50% 51-75% >75%
Mining 3 1 1 0
Computers & IT 1 3 2 8
Hi-Tech industry 29 18 10 8
Other industry 27 13 5 2
Construction 6 0 0 1
Tourism and entertainment 6 4 1 1
Banking and finance 1 1 3 2
Business services 1 2 7 9
Education and health 0 1 9 7
TOTAL 74 43 38 38
% of Total Sample 38% 22% 20% 20%
are in banking and finance, computers and IT services, education and
health, and business services. One surprise was the high proportion of
construction enterprises that engage high skilled non-South African
personnel. Sectors of the economy with a low foreign skill component
include mining, other industrial, industrial high-tech, and, least affected
of all, entertainment and tourism.
Across the 200 surveyed enterprises, however, foreign skilled person-
nel number in total only between 2,000 - 3,000 workers (Table 2.7).
The largest individual pockets are in education and health, and banking
and finance. These small numbers, however, should not devalue the sig-
nificance of this foreign skilled workforce component. In many
instances, it represents the highest echelons of corporate management
(managing directors) or critical elements for the workings of enterprises
across several sectors, not least in education and health.
In absolute numbers, therefore, the foreign high skill component is
only a minor element in the skills profile of major South African enter-
prises. Indeed, only 11% of sample enterprises employ more than 10 non-
South African high skilled personnel. Quite clearly the sectors of the
economy that are most heavily affected by the engagement of foreign
skilled personnel are education and health and banking and finance.
In certain multinational enterprises, foreign skilled personnel are not
in South Africa on a long-term basis. Rather, they are part of intra-cor-
porate movements involving a rotation of personnel or exchange pro-
grammes. The sources of foreign skilled personnel vary, with the most
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Table 2.6: Composition of Skilled Employees by Citizenship
Sector No. of Companies No. of Companies
With Skilled with Skilled
Workforce 100% Workforce Partly
South African Foreign
Mining 3 3
Computers & I.T. 5 9
High-tech industrial 46 22
Other industrial 27 20
Construction 2 5
Banking and finance 1 7
Business services 7 12
Entertainment and Tourism 9 4
Education and Health 6 10
TOTAL 106 92
Percent of Sample 54% 46%
NOTE: The category “South African” includes permanent residents of South Africa. The “Foreign” category refers to
those on work permit.
common countries of origin being the United Kingdom, Germany, the
USA, Italy, and Australia. Significant numbers were also from Portugal,
the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Russia. Overall, the numbers of skilled
personnel recruited from other African countries was relatively small with
the largest sources being Zimbabwe and Ghana. Indeed, because of its
proximity and close ties with South African business, Zimbabwe was the
most common African source for skilled personnel recruitment.
In sum, this study reveals the relatively small numbers of non-South
African skilled personnel in relation to total employment in the coun-
try. Overall, non-South Africans represent more than 5% of the total
labour force in only 8% of our sample enterprises.
THE EFFECT OF THE BRAIN DRAIN
This section investigates the effects of the emigration of skilled personnel
on the operations of enterprises in South Africa. Interviewees were asked
to assess the flow and impact of emigration during two different periods:
the period before the democratic transition and the four years (1994-
1998) since.
First, the companies say that the impact of the emigration of skilled
personnel has been much greater in the post-elections period (Table 2.8).
Moreover, the tempo of emigration of skilled personnel appears to have
escalated, especially from 1996 onwards. Overall, one-third of enterprises
rated as “significant” the outflow and impact of the emigration of skilled
personnel in the post-apartheid period compared to a corresponding 
rating of 2% in the pre-elections period.
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Table 2.7: Proportion of Skilled Non-South Africans (No. of Companies)
Sector 0% of 1-10% of 11-50% of 51-100% of
Skilled Skilled Skilled Skilled 
Workforce Workforce Workforce Workforce
Mining 4 1 1 0
Computers & I.T. 5 8 0 0
High-tech 45 21 1 0
Other industrial 26 16 5 0
Construction 2 4 1 0
Banking and finance 1 4 1 2
Business services 7 10 2 0
Entertainment and tourism 9 4 0 0
Education and health 7 2 4 2
TOTAL 106 70 15 4
Percent of Total Sample 54% 36% 8% 3%
For policy makers this finding is alarming for it underscores an accel-
erating trend in the exodus of skilled personnel from South Africa.34
More importantly, this out-migration is beginning to exert an important
impact on the workings of major South African enterprises. Indeed, the
finding signals a real danger for policy makers. Unless measures are
introduced to retain existing skilled personnel or to facilitate a counter-
flow of skilled personnel into the country, the ramifications of the brain
drain on the functioning of the South African economy may become
more widespread. Moreover, at the time of survey, the demand for
skilled personnel has been dampened by a period of low economic
growth. The chairperson of a sectoral manufacturers association noted:
“Skills are in such short supply that I don’t know what (South African)
business will do if there is an economic upturn.”
A second key result is more positive for policy makers. Against the
very clear evidence of growing emigration from South Africa is the
finding that this is of only minor importance compared to the total
skills base of surveyed enterprises. In 41% of enterprises the issue of
emigration of high skilled personnel was rated as of no importance
whatsoever and in a further 26% of cases of only “negligible” signifi-
cance. What these results suggest is that whilst the brain drain contin-
ues, there are few signs at present of a crippling of enterprises due to an
inability to source necessary replacement skills. Once again, however,
the situation during the post-elections period has become progressively
worse. Some 98% of responding enterprises rated the impact of emigra-
tion as none or negligible before 1994. The corresponding figure for the
post-1994 period falls to 67%.
A third key finding is the sectoral variation in the impact of the
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Table 2.8: Impact of Emigration of Skilled Personnel on Companies
Sector PRE-1994 POST-1994
None Negligible Significant None Negligible Significant
Mining 3 1 0 1 3 2
Computers & I.T. 6 4 1 4 5 5
High-tech industrial 55 11 0 33 12 24
Other industrial 40 6 0 18 18 11
Construction 5 1 0 5 1 1
Banking and finance 3 3 1 1 3 3
Business services 13 3 0 5 5 9
Entertainment and tourism 10 2 0 11 1 1
Education and health 7 7 1 3 4 10
Total 142 38 3 81 52 66
Percent of Total Sample 78% 21% 2% 41% 26% 33%
emigration of high-skilled personnel. In the pre-1994 elections period,
emigration flows were deemed significant for only a handful of the sur-
vey sample of enterprises (2% of the total). At the time of the survey,
the numbers of enterprises reporting a significant impact had risen
appreciably especially within five sectors: education and health (59%),
business services (47%), banking and finance (43%), computers and IT
services (35%) and industrial high tech (35%). Sectors least affected by
emigration were entertainment and tourism, and construction — both
are areas of the economy in which the ratio of skilled personnel to total
employment is relatively low.
Fourth, South African enterprises confront a different situation to
multinational companies operating in South Africa. For South African-
owned enterprises, the effects of an emigration of high level skills
appear to be more problematic. Foreign companies can source skills
from the enterprise’s global network of employees, through short-term
appointments, staff exchanges or recruitment within the existing inter-
national network. The financial resources and power of these global
enterprises reduces the potential impact of the emigration of high level
skills. 
The open-ended responses of interviewees to questions concerning
the emigration of skilled personnel disclosed a number of important
themes. First, the reasons for departure from South Africa confirm
media concerns about crime and violence, the downturn in the econo-
my, and perceptions of falling standards in the public education and
health sectors.35 Another core reason given for the drain of skilled per-
sonnel is the highly attractive salary packages offered by enterprises in
North America, Europe and Australia. In the specific case of the health
sector, Saudi Arabia was an important destination for skilled nurses
because of the lucrative employment packages available.36
Second, a notable proportion of departing skilled personnel are indi-
viduals returning to their countries of birth after living and working in
South Africa (as permanent residents) for lengthy periods. Not surpris-
ingly, the most common destinations for this type of emigrant are the
United Kingdom and Germany. This includes many personnel towards
the end of their working careers.
Third, in the case of younger skilled personnel, the reasons for
departure include seeking a broader international work experience. This
particular group of skilled employees therefore may not necessarily rep-
resent a permanent loss to the South African economy. Nevertheless,
some younger skilled emigration is undoubtedly permanent because of
the attractive work packages offered by overseas enterprises.
Finally, Gauteng-based enterprises experience the worst problems. A
common theme in the corporate interviews was of Gauteng personnel
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seeking internal transfers to the Western Cape because of its attractive
residential environment and perceived lower levels of crime and vio-
lence. On a long-term basis, this trend might threaten and undermine
Gauteng’s position and long-term economic development as South
Africa’s “smart province.”
The most severe emerging skills shortage clearly relates to computing
and information technology personnel. A global labour market has
emerged in the sphere of computing and IT skills. Within this market,
South Africa is rapidly losing competitive ground to the aggressive
recruitment strategies and lucrative employment packages of enterprises
in the USA, Western Europe and Australasia.37 As one specialist IT ser-
vice enterprise stated: “South African IT personnel are highly mar-
ketable all over the world. As a company this is difficult to counter. We
offer staff share options which mature after three years of service but for
most this is not enough of a sweetener to make them stay.”
The emerging shortage of specialist computing and IT service person-
nel is a pervasive problem in the South African economy. Several other
cracks are emerging in the existing skills base of South Africa. One was
exposed in an interview with a major multinational pharmaceutical and
chemicals concern. Based on an internal audit and needs analysis, the
recruitment of specialist local skills, such as pharmacists, veterinarians,
chemical engineers or environmental specialists, is still not a major prob-
lem. But major difficulty arises at the higher management and supervisory
scale where composite skills and experience are necessary.
Another crack was evident in several interviews with industrial and
high technology enterprises. Whilst technical skills, such as engineering
skills, were possible to source, signally absent was a more sophisticated
marriage or combination of technical and financial or sales/marketing
experience required for high level managerial appointments. Indeed, the
issue of the shortage of high level personnel in South Africa with both
technical and financial or marketing skills was a consistent theme.
Certain specialist niches of skills are also showing signs of drying up
in the South African labour pool. Many are of a highly technical and
very specialized nature. They include logistics industrial engineers,
armature winders, control engineers, polishers for high quality furniture
manufacturers, instrumentation engineers, civil engineers with project
management experience, telecommunications personnel with a combi-
nation of technical and sales expertise, and many others.
A factor that underpins some of the emerging shortages is the run-
down or lack of take-up of certain apprenticeship programmes. As one
interviewee argued: “No one is coming through the ranks...young peo-
ple do not want to go through apprenticeships and consequently we will
be suffering shortages in the near future.” Another factor relates to
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South Africa’s isolation from the international economy which has
resulted in a shortage of experience and qualified personnel in several
areas of international marketing.
Further insights into the impact of recent emigration of skilled per-
sonnel from South Africa are provided by the following selection of
quotations:
“We are losing marketing skills rapidly to overseas compa-
nies. The company has lost 20% of its workforce since the
end of 1997 to Dubai, Australia and the USA. These skills
have been built up locally as people have been trained and
had a few overseas trips to further their training. Then they
were poached or they up and go overseas. It is almost a
waste of all the time and money spent on their training.
One of the people who went to Australia was an IT spe-
cialist and marketing manager so a big loss to the company.
A South African survey in which we took part revealed
that IT remuneration within South Africa was OK but
internationally we were not competitive.” (International
IT company)
“There is a lot of uncertainty among the younger staff
members. Some of them left before the elections and they
are still going. We try and counter this by using our inter-
national mother company contacts to send South African
employees overseas. They pay back time overseas with time
worked at the South African office. By doing this, more
employees consider staying with the company in South
Africa because there is something in it for them. However,
as many as 50% do not come back.” (South African office
of blue-chip international financial services company)
“One non-executive director left for Australia after he was
car-jacked and a gun put to his five-year old child’s head.
In the last two years (1997 and 1998) a lot of people have
spoken about leaving. It is the general topic of conversa-
tion. Crime is the number one problem. Everyone says that
they don’t want to go but will leave if something (crime-
related) happens to them or their family.” (Large industrial
company)
“The MD was going to leave (overseas) and take the com-
pany with him but he was shot dead one month before
leaving. The company is expecting to lose quite a few
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skilled personnel in the near future. They are preparing to
go overseas because of the crime and violence in the coun-
try and because they see little future for white males in
South Africa.” (High technology industrial enterprise)
DEALING IN SCARCE RESOURCES
South African enterprises clearly regard high skilled personnel as a
resource that is beginning to deplete and even exhibit signs of scarcity.
Moreover, competition for such scarce resources is growing more intense
both as a result of internationalized labour markets for several sectors
(most importantly computer and IT service personnel) and as a result of
democratic South Africa’s late re-insertion into the international econ-
omy.
APPROACHES TO RECRUITMENT
The major potential source of recruitment for new high skill personnel is
South Africa rather than overseas. The survey disclosed that the majority
of enterprises prefer to hire local South African personnel into high skill
positions whenever possible. The advantages of local personnel are sever-
al and obvious.
First, foreigners often require a period of settling-in before becoming
adapted to the local business environment. Second, the hiring of South
African personnel is considerably cheaper, particularly in terms of relo-
cation costs, home leave, housing and school fee allowances. Indeed,
many companies stress that the recruitment of foreign personnel is a last
resort as the costs of hiring from Europe or USA are so onerous because
the recruited employee is often paid a package comparable to that in
their country of origin. Even the costs of recruitment of skilled person-
nel from other parts of Africa are extremely high. Overall, the survey
disclosed no differentiation in the recruitment of skilled personnel from
Europe, North America or Africa. The key issue in recruitment was the
quality of the individual person rather than the country of origin.
Table 2.9 shows the different kinds of recruiting methods deployed
by the 200 surveyed enterprises. The majority of enterprises use more
than one method, usually for different types of skilled personnel. The
most common technique is the engagement of specialist personnel
agencies to track and hire new skilled personnel; nearly 60% of enter-
prises use the services of such agencies. In certain sectors, however, the
use of such specialist agencies is avoided as it is felt that they do not
understand the highly specialized needs for skilled technical personnel,
for example, in parts of the food sector.
Beyond the use of specialist personnel recruitment agencies, other
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methods include in-house advertising, newspaper personnel advertise-
ments, word-of-mouth advertising, and use of general personnel agen-
cies. In word-of-mouth recruitment, bonuses sometimes are offered to
existing staff if they are successful in sourcing new high skill personnel.
Whilst the employment of headhunters is one of the least utilised
recruitment methods, it is the preferred method for recruiting senior
personnel (such as corporate managers) or specialized research and
development (R&D) personnel. Headhunting is also a strategy for
poaching personnel with necessary experience for top level managerial
appointments. Finally, the category of “other recruitment methods”
includes linkages to Universities or technikons through bursaries or
graduate recruitment programmes, the use of internet advertising, and
recruitment through industry training boards.
THE QUESTION OF TRAINING
A key issue in offsetting the brain drain is the training programmes
offered to employees. The operation of training programmes is a major
means for expanding an enterprise’s asset base of skilled personnel. As
one industrial listed enterprise argued: “We know a lot of skills have left
South Africa but it is important to train existing employees up. There is
still a lot of untapped skills available.”
A positive finding was that the vast majority of the surveyed enter-
prises — 85% of the total —are involved in some form of training and
skills upgrading of their personnel. In many cases the budgets allocated
to training and upgrading of personnel are substantial and impressive.
For example, one leading listed South African-owned industrial enter-
prise has an annual training budget in excess of R4 million. As a conse-
quence, this particular specialist enterprise “had no gaps in expertise as
they bring people up through the company ranks.” In this company the
training programme necessitated the import of overseas personnel on 
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Table 2.9: Recruitment Methods for Skilled Personnel
Method Percent of Companies
In-house 31
Head hunters 14
Newspapers 30
Agencies 24
Specialist agency 58
Word of mouth 25
Other 5
N = 200. Note: The total exceeds 100% as many enterprises used several different
methods of recruitment
2-3 year contracts: “They share their skills and knowledge and by the
end of the contract the South African personnel are able to competent-
ly take on the job.”
The most common approach to skills training is through in-house or
enterprise training programmes (Table 2.10). Of the sample enterprises,
62% are engaged actively in the business of in-house training for skilled
personnel. A second, less common, approach is to bring in skilled per-
sonnel from overseas to operate training programmes. This training
strategy is particularly prevalent amongst overseas-based multinational
enterprises in South Africa. A third, and more common, training
approach is to send South African personnel overseas for a period to
upgrade their skills. Nearly 35% of sample enterprises applied this
approach, including many multinationals who choose to send South
African personnel to their parent plant or head offices on technology
exchange programmes. Another aspect of overseas training is the spon-
soring of South African personnel to attend international short courses
or conferences. Finally, the outsourcing of training to other South
African institutions is a strategy for one-third of enterprises. Among
these specialist local training institutions are South African university
business schools and local technikons.
The training of South African personnel is a double-edged sword for
many enterprises. On the one hand, training programmes improve the
personnel skills and asset resources of enterprises. On the other hand,
the heightened skills of employees opens the danger of corporate poach-
ing, including from overseas enterprises, as well as increasing the 
general awareness and marketability of South African skilled employees
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Table 2.10: Training Methods for Skilled Personnel
Sector Number of Companies in Each Category
In-house Bring In Send Use Local No Training
Trainers Overseas Institution Offered
Mining 1 1 1 1 3
Computers & IT 11 2 4 4 0
High-tech industrial 46 14 27 23 10
Other industrial 36 7 12 23 2
Construction 6 0 3 1 1
Banking and finance 3 3 6 1 0
Business services 10 1 8 7 3
Entertainment and tourism 5 5 4 1 2
Education and health 6 3 4 6 9
Total 124 36 69 67 30
NOTE: Responses add up to more than 200 companies as many enterprises used more than one training method.
to alternative job opportunities.
The quality of South African IT personnel, health professionals and
engineers is recognized by international overseas recruitment agencies.
In perhaps the most extreme case recorded in the survey, a Boston-
based computer training company came to South Africa to train person-
nel employed in a high technology defence-related business. The
Boston representative was so impressed by the calibre of the South
African IT personnel that “within three months they had poached the
entire department.”
THE QUALITY OF NEW RECRUITS
In the context of accelerating opportunities for skilled personnel interna-
tionally and factors locally such as crime and violence, South African
enterprises are necessarily having to treat their skilled labour resources
very carefully. Moreover, as mentioned above, training is of critical signif-
icance in maintaining the quality of an individual enterprise’s labour
force.
In the vast majority of cases (86%) the quality of new personnel is
rated as either the same or better than that of the outgoing personnel.
That so many enterprises are satisfied with the newly hired high skilled
personnel is perhaps an indicator that the dramatic popular press sce-
narios of impending economic collapse due to brain drain haemorrhage
are massively exaggerated. In some cases, the departure of skilled per-
sonnel is seen as offering opportunities for new blood:
“Sanctions have gone and there are a lot more opportuni-
ties. New recruits have brought benefits to the company.
Prior to 1994 a lot of people in industry sat in the same job
for years. Now, however, there are new people with new
ideas and this shift is good for the company.” (Industrial
high technology company)
The high degree of satisfaction with new local recruits is an indica-
tion that most training and educational institutions in South Africa
continue to produce the quality of skills that are required for the econo-
my to be globally competitive. That said, a number of areas of concern
were noted by interviewees. In particular, several industrial companies
drew attention to the fact that whilst university graduates remain of
high quality, educational and training standards had fallen at the tech-
nikons. One multinational food and drinks company noted that “tech-
nical standards have dropped and we will now only consider university
graduates.”
Although there is general satisfaction with the quality of new local
personnel, many enterprises drew attention to the increased difficulty
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and time spent in recruiting. Another common concern relates to the
high remuneration packages required and demanded by high skill per-
sonnel in South Africa. In a situation of growing shortages for high skill
labour, the costs attached to recruiting such labour have risen markedly.
A large South African owned industrial enterprise bemoaned the fact
that “new recruits come with a premium. If you want quality, you have
to pay more.”
Another important issue is the loss of experience in personnel that
emigrate. A large South African-owned industrial enterprise summed up
the situation: “Expertise is lost, the base skill is the same but insight
into the industry is lacking.” A high technology manufacturing enter-
prise concurred: “The generic skills in South Africa are still OK.
However, when top people emigrate, it is a big loss as it takes 3-4 years
for the new recruit to rise to that level.”
Finally, a local listed manufacturing enterprise pointed out that: “We
find that we don’t get all the skills we require when we recruit. We have
to live with it and hope that the new recruits pick up the necessary
skills on the job.”
RECRUITMENT OF SKILLED PERSONNEL FROM OVERSEAS
The recruiting of skilled personnel from outside South Africa is a final
option (and often a last resort) for addressing shortages of skilled per-
sonnel in the South African labour pool. Table 2.11 presents findings
concerning the dealings of the enterprises with the South African
Department of Home Affairs. The first point is that 58% of the inter-
viewees had no direct experience of dealing with the Department of
Home Affairs. But 42% were in a position to comment on a history and
experience of interaction with the Department. Many enterprises deal
with the Department at a distance, filtered through the use of an
agency, lawyers or consultants. At least 12 enterprises actually employ
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Table 2.11: Relationships with the Department of Home Affairs
Have You Ever Dealt with Home Affairs in Recruiting Skilled 
Personnel from Outside the Country? (%)
Yes 42
No 58
How Would Rate Your Experience in Dealing with Home Affairs (%)
Very positive 1
Adequate 38
Negative 31
Very negative 29
N = 200, 68
consultants, lawyers or agents as intermediaries.
The broad findings are not complimentary to the Department as a
whole. The majority of respondents (60%) rated as “negative” or “very
negative” their experience of dealing with the Department when
recruiting high skilled personnel. Another 38% of interviewees rate
their dealings with the Department of Home Affairs as only “adequate.”
Only one interviewee in a sample of 200 responded very enthusiastical-
ly and rated them as “very positive.” Multinational companies appear to
experience fewer difficulties than South African enterprises in securing
work permits for skilled staff from overseas. The procedures for intra-
company transfers across international borders are somewhat more
relaxed than for the direct recruitment of new personnel from overseas.
Positive or adequate responses were associated with the development
of contacts and long-term relationships with very senior staff at the
Department of Home Affairs or linkages with high ranking officials in
other departments. Indeed, the level of understanding and assistance
offered by senior personnel at Home Affairs was a factor appreciated by
many enterprises. It appears that enterprises experience a learning curve
in their dealings with the Department, beginning with highly negative
experiences and shifting later to more positive assessments as they
develop relationships with senior staff.
The troubling picture that emerges is that it is “who you know at
Home Affairs” that is an important determinant of the kind of problems
experienced in staff recruitment from overseas. Several commented that
“If you know someone (at Home Affairs) it is easier” or that the “right
people are very helpful.” Strikingly, the most positive assessments of the
Department of Home Affairs came from two parastatal agencies. In one
interview, Home Affairs was described as “brilliant” and in the other
the enterprise only has to “speak to Trevor Manuel (the Minister of
Finance) and the person they need is appointed very quickly.”
The overall picture that crystallizes is that the Department of Home
Affairs is a major obstacle to South African enterprises urgently seeking
to recruit high level skilled personnel. Across the different sectors cap-
tured by the survey, similar descriptions were applied and the same
themes repeated. A host of interviewees spoke in stark terms of their
experience with Home Affairs as “shocking”, “horrendous”, “nightmar-
ish” (the most common description), “crazy”, “dreadful”, “pathetic”,
“time-consuming” or “awful.”
Several structural problems appear to exist which block or frustrate
the entry of skilled personnel from overseas.
• Excessive time is required to deal with the bureaucratic processes.
Interviewees spoke of waiting for 2-3 months for something to happen
in the Department, a delay that is costly for businesses. Many indicated
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that they were wholeheartedly in support of the principle of seeking to
employ South African personnel as a first preference. However, once
those options were exhausted the bureaucratic procedures that they
confront are far too lengthy and urgently need to be streamlined.
• Overall, the view is widespread that Home Affairs processes for
securing high skilled personnel are highly obstructive, time consuming
and far too procedural. Other common complaints are that service is
shocking, queues outrageous and the waiting time for applications
(sometimes up to 5 months) unduly long.
• The increasing cost to companies of using lawyers or consultants
and the efficiency losses due to delays in recruitment of personnel from
overseas. An associated set of issues is the costs imposed upon the
affected individuals. The financial cost of applying to come and work in
South Africa may be R8000, an amount that is seen as too costly to
risk, especially when individuals may go through the bureaucratic proce-
dures and then be denied the necessary work permit. In addition, fees of
R5000 were quoted as baseline charge to hire lawyers “who know some-
body at Home Affairs”, a cost which amounts to thinly veiled bribery.
• Lack of transparency in the decision-making process within Home
Affairs. Interviewees stressed that everyone who goes through the
bureaucratic process may be treated in a different way. An interviewee
from a leading high technology manufacturer stated that “there is no
control and no set procedures so you are at their mercy.” Enterprises
complain that no reasons are given for the rejection of particular appli-
cations whilst others admit that direct bribes have been paid in Pretoria
to secure the entry into South Africa of desperately needed industrial
personnel. Overall, a very common opinion is that the Department is
“xenophobic” and that in recent years it has made the entry (as well as
renewal of permits) of highly qualified personnel into South Africa
more difficult .
• The lack of transparency in the internal operations, functioning
and staffing at the Department of Home Affairs. Several companies
spoke of telephone contacts as almost impossible with the Pretoria
office. Moreover, the unprofessional conduct of Home Affairs personnel
was commonly mentioned. If Home Affairs personnel could be reached
they were “unobliging and a pain.” The experience of dealing with staff
was described in an interview with a major industrial enterprise as like
“talking to rocks.” Another human resource manager for a major multi-
national enterprise said that within Home Affairs procedural methods
need to be radically re-assessed: “If they don’t like the tone of my voice
they could refuse the work permit.”
• The Department of Home Affairs dismally fails to understand the
needs of business for high qualified personnel. Several companies spoke
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of Home Affairs paying “lip service” to the needs of large business 
enterprise, of failing to talk or consult with business as to its needs for
highly qualified personnel, and lacking any appreciation of the value of
high skilled personnel in creating additional employment opportunities
or of the value of the embedded training and human resource skills that
could potentially flow into South Africa. In one case, a high quality fur-
niture producer requested a work permit for a highly skilled Russian fur-
niture carver. The request was declined; subsequently the carver secured
a Green Card for entry into the USA.
The conclusion from our interviews is that the workings of the
Department of Home Affairs have a negative impact upon affected
enterprises and the economy as a whole. In the case of many private
sector enterprises, new growth and job opportunities for the South
African economy have been either postponed or, in many instances,
lost forever through what employers perceive to be the Department’s
inability, unwillingness or failure to expedite the entry into the country
of a relatively small number of highly skilled personnel.
CONCLUSIONS
The national objectives of making South Africa a world class player and
globally competitive within certain key economic sectors and markets
cannot be realistically achieved without a substantial pool of high skilled
personnel. The issue of high skilled personnel will therefore be of
increased significance to South Africa in the next decade.
Our survey demonstrates that the present skills position within the
South African economy is not yet at crisis or breaking point.
Nevertheless, the emigration of skills through brain drain movements to
North America, Europe or Australasia is occurring at an accelerating
rate. Behind this rising tempo of migration are unacceptable levels of
crime and violence, economic stagnation, and perceptions of declining
standards in the quality of public sector services, most notably educa-
tion and health.
Despite the growing outflow of skills and highly publicised shortages
of public sector health personnel, the skills base is being maintained in
most areas of the economy. The survey, however, points to certain
cracks in this skills base and the potential dangers if certain policy issues
remain unaddressed. Of particular concern is the loss of personnel with
high level experience which can only be made up over many years.
The research shows the nature of the skills shortage that will threat-
en enterprises in South Africa over the coming years. An important
strategic challenge confronting enterprises is in “retaining and securing
of skilled staff” to enable future growth. At the national level, and in
the Department of Home Affairs, a greater degree of appreciation of the
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significance of retaining high skilled personnel is needed. Our findings
suggest that the present attitudes and workings of the Department of
Home Affairs are extremely obstructive and that the Department’s cur-
rent policies concerning high skill personnel function as a negative drag
on the present and future performance of the economy.
Our recommendations to deal with the issue of high skilled person-
nel in South Africa relate to retention of the existing base of skilled
personnel, and the attraction from overseas of additional personnel with
valuable skills that are in local short supply:
• Enterprises themselves must address the question of human
resource upgrading through training and also be sensitive to the growing
competition for staff particularly within certain internationalizing
labour markets for skilled personnel. For national policy makers, the
best policies to retain the skills base are those which grow the economy,
address crime and maintain or improve existing standards in public edu-
cation and health.
• Dealing with overseas personnel requires certain changes in the
internal workings of the Department of Home Affairs, a streamlining of
application and entry procedures for high skilled personnel and greater
transparency in the application process. One step forward, suggested by
many interviewees, would be the introduction of a points system for
immigrants or work permit applicants similar to that in use by many
other countries. But this system has been explicitly repudiated in the
recent Draft White Paper on International Migration, despite its quali-
fied endorsement in the earlier Draft Green Paper on International
Migration.
• Given the critical importance of highly qualified personnel and
their relatively small numbers, it might be appropriate to set up a spe-
cial unit within the Department of Home Affairs to deal with high
skilled personnel. There is a clear need to bridge the existing gap
between private and public perceptions of the need for skilled personnel
in South Africa. A small special unit might be able to liaise more effec-
tively with the major South African users of high skilled personnel (pri-
vate sector business, education and health, high technology) in order to
deal with procedures and approval applications for work and entry into
the country of such personnel.
• The negative perception of the Department of Home Affairs is all-
pervasive in the corporate sector. This perception of incompetence,
favouritism, obstructionism and lack of transparency should be
addressed. Criteria should be clear and consistent and facilitate eco-
nomic growth. Policy reform in the area of high skills import is urgently
needed. The bureaucratic and attitudinal problems experienced by com-
panies can only be addressed by devoting adequate resources to training
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and upgrading skills within the department itself.
• The new corporate work permit system proposed in the Draft
White Paper could ease the problems experienced by many enterprises
when importing high skills personnel. Most enterprises would probably
qualify for such permits. The bizarre proposal to “penalize” companies
financially who import foreign skills is likely to be counter-productive.
As this study shows, enterprises already prefer South African employees,
import only where necessary and bear considerable extra cost in doing
so. The proposal to force employers to pay a “training levy” on foreign-
ers to encourage them to hire locally seems like a cash-grab with little
economic logic.
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